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Preface
Investigating causal relationships plays a central role in empirical economic research.
Some of the classic relationships studied by economists include the effect of educa-
tion on income, the impact of minimum wages on unemployment, and the influence of
wealth on health. Indeed, uncovering causal relationships, as opposed to mere associ-
ations, is crucial from a policy point of view. To be able to design policies that lead to
desired goals, it is usually vital to understand cause and effect. Consider, for example,
the relation between education and income. It has generally been observed that indi-
viduals with more education tend to have higher incomes. If this relationship were the
result of unobserved factors (such as greater innate ability among the more educated)
rather than reflecting a causal effect of education on income, then trying to promote
individual prosperity via education policies would be futile and costly.
Estimating causal effects is often challenging, however, as doing so typically requires
variation in the regressor of interest while all other factors are held constant. The gold
standard for achieving this is to run an experiment in which individuals are randomly
assigned to a treatment of interest. Due to ethical, financial, or political reasons, how-
ever, this is often not possible in economics. For example, most people would prob-
ably find it unacceptable to exclude individuals from the education system to study
how education affects income. This inability to run experiments in many cases has
led to the development of a rich toolkit of methods that empirical economists use to
tease out causality from observational data. Common methods include difference-in-
differences approaches, regression discontinuity designs, instrumental variables, and
matching techniques (see, e.g., Abadie and Cattaneo 2018). More recently, economists
have started to expand the traditional toolkit by methods from machine learning. Ex-
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amples include the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (lasso) and random
forests, as well as adaptations of these that are specifically designed to study causal
relationships (see, e.g., Athey and Imbens 2019).
This thesis contributes to an understanding of causal relationships in a number of im-
portant areas by employing a broad set of empirical methods and using a variety of
data sources. In the first two chapters, I provide evidence on the effects of poverty on
health and cognition. Considering the large number of individuals who live in poverty,
shedding light on its consequences is highly relevant from a policy perspective. In
2017, for example, almost 40 million people in the US lived in poverty (Fontenot et
al. 2018). The third chapter moves on to the subject of survey response behavior and
focuses on response uncertainty among participants in surveys. Despite the advent of
other sources of data, such as financial transactions and social media, surveys continue
to be fundamental to empirical research (Couper 2013). For example, surveys are not
only crucial for research on poverty, as demonstrated by the use of survey data in the
first two chapters, but they also play a key role in the investigation of the challenges
faced by modern societies more generally (see, e.g., the books by Börsch-Supan et al.
2013a; 2019). Understanding the determinants of individuals’ survey response behavior
and related data quality issues is therefore very important. While the first three chapters
study causal relationships, Chapter 4 deals with hypothesis testing under a particular
form of heteroscedasticity. Drawing inferences about parameters of interest is a central
part of empirical research. To be able to do so requires not only valid point estimates,
but also correct standard errors (Cameron and Miller 2015). Chapter 4 provides a range
of insights into this requirement.
The chapters in this thesis are self-contained and can thus be read independently of one
another. The first two chapters are followed by an appendix. The combined references
for all chapters come after Chapter 4. In the following, I provide a more detailed sum-
mary of each chapter.
Chapter 1 is entitled Financial Scarcity and Health: Evidence from the Food Stamp
Program. The starting point for this chapter is the lack of financial resources that dom-
inates the lives of many low-income individuals. Common consequences of these poor
2
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financial circumstances include difficulty affording food or medical care and problems
paying bills. Many studies have documented associations between the experience of
such poor financial circumstances and worse health (see, e.g., Ferrie et al. 2005; Kahn
and Pearlin 2006; Tucker-Seeley et al. 2009). However, while these findings are sug-
gestive, I am not aware of any study so far that has been able to isolate a causal effect of
poor financial circumstances on health. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I provide evidence
on this subject.
Based on a sample of low-income individuals who participate in the Food Stamp Pro-
gram in the US, the analysis uses variation in financial circumstances over the monthly
food stamp payment cycle. A number of studies have documented that the financial
resources of food stamp recipients generally decrease over this monthly cycle, leading
to especially poor financial circumstances at the cycle’s end (e.g., Hastings and Wash-
ington 2010; Shapiro 2005). I estimate the short-run effect of this end-of-cycle financial
scarcity on self-assessed physical health. My empirical strategy exploits the random
assignment of individuals to their interview day in the American Time Use Survey. The
main idea is to compare food stamp recipients interviewed at the end of the monthly
food stamp cycle with food stamp recipients interviewed during the rest of the cycle.
As a result of the interview day randomization, the food stamp recipients are randomly
assigned to one of these two groups of individuals. To guard against confounding due to
events that could occur simultaneously with the end-of-cycle financial scarcity, I extend
the empirical strategy using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation
in food stamp issuance periods across states.
I find that the financial scarcity experienced by food stamp recipients at the end of the
monthly food stamp cycle leads to a sizable increase in the probability of reporting bad
physical health. Randomization checks, robustness checks, and placebo tests support
the validity of this finding. By exploiting the time use information in the American Time
Use Survey, additional analyses suggest that increased stress may be one mechanism
through which this detrimental effect occurs.
The findings suggest a number of policy implications. First, measures taken to alleviate
poverty may simultaneously improve the health of low-income individuals, potentially
reducing the expenditures of public health care programs such as Medicaid. Second,
3
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when designing welfare programs, more subtle features, such as the timing of payments,
can also be important. To mitigate especially poor financial circumstances at the end of
welfare payment cycles and their consequences, for example, it could be beneficial to
distribute benefits across shorter intervals to help individuals smooth their consumption.
Chapter 2 – Heterogeneous Effects of Poverty on Cognition – reports the results of joint
work with Helmut Farbmacher and Martin Spindler. This chapter also contributes to
an understanding of the effects of poor financial circumstances. The motivation for
this chapter originates in the debate about why there are associations between poverty
and potentially less beneficial behavior, such as smoking or playing the lottery. In a
recent article, Mani et al. (2013) put forward a hypothesis that focuses on the financial
circumstances of the poor and the potentially detrimental impact of these on cognition.
The authors suggested that a preoccupation with monetary concerns may reduce the
mental capacity of the poor.1 Yet while Mani et al. (2013) indeed found evidence in
favor of their hypothesis based on experiments in the US and India, only one other
study to date has followed up on this. In an experiment, Carvalho et al. (2016) assigned
a sample of low-income US individuals randomly to perform a number of cognitive tests
before or after payday. The individuals surveyed before payday faced poorer financial
circumstances than those surveyed after payday. However, the authors found no before-
after differences in cognitive function in the full sample or selected subgroups.
The second chapter of the thesis contributes to this nascent literature. We analyze het-
erogeneity in the effect of financial circumstances based on data from the experiment
by Carvalho et al. (2016). To do so, we use the causal forest method by Athey et al.
(2019), which is specifically designed to study treatment effect heterogeneity in experi-
ments. The method is based on the machine learning technique of random forests, and
allows non-linear treatment effects to be estimated in a fully flexible way. In the het-
erogeneity analysis, we include a rich set of 37 pre-treatment covariates, including age,
income, employment status, and measures of past financial strain.
While our estimations do not suggest that the poorer financial circumstances before
payday affect cognition in our full sample, we do find harmful effects for younger and
1The hypothesis thus postulates an immediate effect of financial concerns on cognitive function. If
the concerns were to be alleviated, this would directly free up mental capacity again.
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elderly individuals who received a very low income around the time of the experiment.
For these two groups of individuals, we also find detrimental cognitive effects in an
additional experiment conducted by Carvalho et al. (2016), which we do not use in our
heterogeneity analysis. One implication of our findings is that it could prove helpful for
policy makers to take into account possible variation in cognitive capacity over payment
cycles among the individuals in question. For example, public administration could try
to avoid scheduling appointments with these individuals at the end of their payment
cycles to prevent potentially poor decision making due to impaired cognition.
Chapter 3 is entitled A Natural Experiment on the Role of Response Uncertainty in
Household Surveys. In this chapter, my co-author Joachim Winter and I focus on a
determinant of response quality in household surveys: uncertainty among respondents
about the quantities they are asked to report. Our analysis exploits a natural experiment
that arises from the fact that Social Security checks in the US used to be delivered on
the third day of each month and the notion that the interview dates in the Health and
Retirement Study are quasi-randomly distributed over many weeks. We argue that these
circumstances lead to exogenous variation in the time elapsed between the delivery of a
participant’s last Social Security check and the interview date, which can be considered
a key determinant of response uncertainty in Social Security income.
Based on this natural experiment, we test the following hypotheses. Uncertainty about
the amount of the Social Security payment should be greater the longer the time that
has elapsed since the check was delivered because the respondents may have increasing
difficulty recalling this amount. Moreover, the effect should be larger among respon-
dents whose memory capacity is limited. In addition, we expect the effect to be even
greater among those respondents who have limited memory capacity but are unaware
of this limitation, as their distorted perception may lead them to putting less effort into
recalling the answer to the question. As a measure of uncertainty, we use an indicator
for whether an individual gave a rounded check amount as response. Rounding has been
shown to be related to subjective uncertainty (see, e.g., Ruud et al. 2014). A number
of studies have documented how various issues related to limited memory may lead to
measurement error in economic variables, such as income or consumption expenditure
(see, e.g., the literature reviewed by Browning et al. 2003; Browning et al. 2014). How-
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ever, little is known about the direct role of respondents’ uncertainty in determining the
quality of such data. In this chapter, we provide evidence on this question.
Overall, the findings from our empirical analysis are in line with our hypotheses, even
though the effects we estimate are relatively small. One may therefore ask whether our
results are relevant for practical work. However, we believe that our findings are valu-
able considering that reporting one’s Social Security income is arguably an easy enough
task that one would probably not expect to find any effects at all. Our results suggest that
it could be useful if survey agencies were to make metadata, such as interview dates,
routinely available, as these could potentially be exploited to correct for measurement
errors related to uncertainty in individuals’ survey responses.
Chapter 4, entitled Testing under a Special Form of Heteroscedasticity, is joint work
with Helmut Farbmacher. In this chapter, we deal with a special form of heteroscedas-
ticity that leads to an upward bias in conventional, homoscedasticity-assuming stan-
dard errors. Most commonly, heteroscedasticity leads to conventional standard er-
rors that are downward biased. When Wald tests based on these standard errors are
insignificant, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors do not change test decisions.
Conversely, in situations where conventional standard errors are upward biased, using
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors may lead to different test decisions, and thus
to different policy conclusions.
To be able to test for the presence of this special form of heteroscedasticity, we de-
velop a heterocedasticity test. In Monte Carlo simulations, we show that our test is
more powerful at detecting the special form of heteroscedasticity than are standard het-
eroscedasticity tests. This may be related to the fact that the standard test procedures
test for heteroscedasticity in general, rather than the special form, and that some tests
may not be well suited for detecting the non-linear nature of the heteroscedasticity of
interest. In the Monte Carlo simulations, we additionally demonstrate that Wald tests
using conventional standard errors lead to an actual test size that is below the given nom-
inal level under the special form of heteroscedasticity. Conversely, Wald tests based on
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors have a correct size, and are more powerful.
In our application, we demonstrate possible consequences of the special form of het-
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eroscedasticity. Amin (2011), building on work of Bonjour et al. (2003), estimated the
return to education in a sample of twins. Based on conventional standard errors, his
analysis did not yield a return to education estimate significantly different from zero for
most of his within-twin pair regressions. Using two standard heteroscedasticity tests, we
found no evidence for the presence of heteroscedasticity in Amin’s (2011) data. Con-
versely, our proposed test does indeed suggest that the special form of heteroscedas-
ticity is present. We then re-estimate Amin’s (2011) regressions, using appropriate,
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Doing so yields, for most of his estimations,
an estimated return to education that is significantly different from zero at conventional
levels.
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Chapter 1
Financial Scarcity and Health:
Evidence from the Food Stamp
Program
1.1 Introduction
In 2014, almost one in five Americans lived in poverty or near poverty (DeNavas-Walt
and Proctor 2015; Hokayem and Heggeness 2014). A central theme in the lives of many
low-income individuals is the lack of financial resources. As a result of this financial
scarcity, low-income individuals often find themselves in a struggle to make ends meet,
involving hardships such as problems paying bills and difficulty affording food or med-
ical care (e.g., Barr 2012; Edin and Lein 1997; Ouellette et al. 2004). Investigating
the causal consequences of such poor financial circumstances has recently become of
interest to economists, who have so far focused on outcomes related to cognition and
decision-making (see, e.g., Carvalho et al. 2016; Mani et al. 2013; Schilbach et al.
2016).
In epidemiology and related fields, a number of studies have documented that living
in poor financial circumstances is associated with worse health. For example, poor
financial circumstances have been found to be correlated with bad self-assessed health,
8
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depression, illness symptoms, limitations in activities of daily living, serious chronic
conditions, heart attacks, and mortality.1 However, despite these suggestive findings,
which are based not only on cross-sectional but also on longitudinal data, it is still
not clear to what extent poor financial circumstances causally affect health. Given the
large sums of money spent on the health of low-income individuals, understanding this
relationship is highly relevant from a policy perspective.2 Unfortunately, empirically
isolating causal effects of financial circumstances on health is challenging. Causal effect
estimates may be confounded not only by unobserved individual characteristics (such
as a potentially worse health status of the financially strained in general) but also by
reverse causality (i.e., health affecting financial circumstances).
This paper provides causal evidence on the effect of financial circumstances on health,
based on a sample of low-income individuals who participate in the US Food Stamp
Program (FSP). Previous studies have documented that the financial resources of food
stamp recipients generally decrease over the monthly food stamp payment cycle, lead-
ing to especially poor financial circumstances at the cycle’s end. I denote this state at
the end of the monthly cycle in which many food stamp recipients’ financial resources
are especially scarce as financial scarcity. I estimate the short-run effect of this finan-
cial scarcity on self-assessed physical health by exploiting the random assignment of
individuals to their interview day in the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
The main idea behind the empirical strategy is to compare food stamp recipients in-
terviewed at the end of the monthly food stamp payment cycle with food stamp recip-
ients interviewed during the rest of the cycle. The random interview day assignment
implies that the individuals are randomly assigned to one of these two groups of indi-
viduals. Balance checks confirm the success of the random assignment. To account
1Bad self-assessed health (Gunasekara et al. 2013; Kahn and Pearlin 2006; Wickrama et al. 2006;
Stronks et al. 1998), depression (Butterworth et al. 2009; Schulz et al. 2006), illness symptoms (Kahn
and Pearlin 2006; Stronks et al. 1998), limitations in activities of daily living (Szanton et al. 2010),
serious chronic conditions (Kahn and Pearlin 2006), heart attacks (Ferrie et al. 2005), mortality (Tucker-
Seeley et al. 2009). The studies measure poor financial circumstances typically by using indices that
combine questions about whether individuals experience various hardships (such as the ones mentioned
above).
2For example, in 2012, the US public expenditures for Medicaid amounted to approximately $432
billion (Truffer et al. 2013). This corresponds to around eight times the amount spent in the same year on
the Earned Income Tax Credit scheme (Carrington et al. 2013), which is another major welfare program
in the US.
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for confounding events that may occur simultaneously with financial scarcity and to
protect against imperfect random assignment, I extend the estimation approach using a
difference-in-differences approach with two different control groups that exploits varia-
tion in food stamp issuance periods across states. Given the empirical strategy and tem-
porary nature of the financial scarcity that I focus on, this study speaks to the short-run
effect of a temporary particularly poor financial situation among a group of low-income
individuals in the US.3
The estimations yield that the experience of the end-of-cycle financial scarcity has a
detrimental effect on an individual’s self-assessed physical health. Several robustness
checks and placebo tests support the validity of this finding.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the Food
Stamp Program and the financial circumstances over the food stamp cycle. Section 1.3
explains the empirical strategy. Section 1.4 describes the data and shows the results
from randomization checks. Section 1.5 presents the main results. Section 1.6 discusses
two potential mechanisms through which the effect of interest may occur. Section 1.7
presents the results from robustness checks and placebo tests. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Program is one of the central elements of the US social safety net.4
In 2014, the FSP provided assistance to 46.5 million people at a cost of $74.2 billion
(Gray and Kochhar 2015). The main goal of the FSP is to reduce food insecurity. It does
so by distributing vouchers to eligible households that can be used to buy most food
items at grocery stores and other authorized retailers (e.g., alcohol and prepared foods
cannot be bought with food stamps). Although they are in-kind benefits, food stamp
3Carvalho et al. (2016) and Mani et al. (2013) also use variation in financial resources around
paydays to examine the effects of financial circumstances. However, they administer their own surveys
and look at outcomes related to cognition and economic decision-making.
4The FSP was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in October 2008.
However, I refer to the program as FSP, because the empirical analysis uses data from a time period when
the program was mostly called FSP.
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recipients treat food stamps similarly to cash transfers of the same amount (Hoynes and
Schanzenbach 2009).
The FSP is federally funded and its rules are mostly set at the federal level. There is
little variation in the program across states and its characteristics have not varied much
in the last few decades (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2016).
In contrast to other welfare programs, eligibility for the FSP is universal. It is not
restricted to specific groups in the population, such as the disabled or families with
children. Generally, for a household to be eligible for food stamps, it must satisfy three
criteria based on its monthly gross income, net income calculated by making permitted
deductions from the gross income, and its countable resources. For example, one of the
criteria is that the gross monthly household income must not be greater than 130 percent
of the poverty line. In addition, there are households that are categorically eligible for
food stamps and, therefore, need not fulfill the three criteria.
The amount that a household receives in food stamps is calculated by subtracting 30
percent of the household’s net income from a maximum benefit amount, which depends
on the size of the household and is adapted annually to reflect food price changes. In
2007, the average food stamp household received $212 in monthly food stamps and
consisted of 2.2 individuals. Its gross monthly income was $691, net monthly income
$330, and its countable resources amounted to $144 (Wolkwitz and Leftin 2008). Thus,
while the benefit amount may not seem much at $212, food stamps are still an important
part of the income of the average food stamp household considering its low financial
resources.
Each food stamp household in every state receives its food stamp benefits once per
month. However, the timing of when the benefits are paid out within the month varies
across states. Table A.1 in the appendix lists the issuance periods for all states during the
sample period. While some states issue all of their food stamps on one day of the month,
such as New Hampshire and Virginia, most states stagger the food stamp distribution,
i.e., they distribute the benefits over a period of days. Among the states that stagger the
food stamp payments, there is variation in the day of the month when a state starts its is-
suance period and how long the period lasts. For example, California issues food stamps
between the first and tenth day of each month, whereas Mississippi distributes the ben-
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efits between day 5 and day 19 each month.5 Within the given issuance period, each
state determines the food stamp delivery day for a household quasi-randomly, based on,
for example, the Social Security number or case number. A household’s food stamp
delivery day is always the same each month.
Since 2004, all states issue food stamp benefits via an electronic system called Elec-
tronic Benefit Transfer (EBT). On the specified food stamp delivery day, the monthly
benefits of a household are transferred to its EBT card, which works similar to a con-
ventional debit card. The food stamp benefits are, therefore, immediately available on
the designated delivery day and they can be used for shopping right away.
1.2.2 Financial Circumstances over the Food Stamp Cycle
A number of studies have investigated the financial circumstances and related behaviors
of food stamp households over their monthly food stamp cycle, i.e., the time from one
food stamp benefit payment to the next.
Using data from retailers (e.g., Castellari et al. 2017; Goldin et al. 2016; Hastings and
Washington 2010) and surveys (e.g., Shapiro 2005; Wilde and Ranney 2000), research
finds evidence that the expenditures of food stamp households decrease in the time since
the last receipt of food stamps. For example, based on panel data containing 1.13 million
observations over the period 2004–2011, Goldin et al. (2016) estimate a 27 percent drop
in food expenditures between the first and last week of the monthly food stamp cycle
for food stamp eligible households relative to non-food stamp households.6
Related to these studies, Cole and Lee (2005) examine food stamp redemption patterns
using actual transaction data from the EBT system. Their analysis yields that food stamp
households spend on average 80 percent of their food stamp benefits within the first 14
5Foley (2011) investigates what factors influence how states set their welfare payment schedules. He
finds that common considerations include monthly budget processes, administrative program aspects, and
requests from retailers to reduce monthly demand fluctuations by staggering welfare payments. However,
he also finds that for many programs and jurisdictions the payment schedules were set a long time ago
and why they were set the way they are is not documented. Foley’s (2011) findings thus suggest that there
are no clear systematic reasons for the variation in issuance periods across states.
6Studies based on other populations have also found that individual expenditure behavior is sensitive
to the timing of income receipt (see, e.g., Johnson et al. 2006; Shapiro and Slemrod 1995; Stephens 2003;
2006).
12
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL SCARCITY AND HEALTH
days of the food stamp cycle. After 21 days, they have exhausted almost all of their food
stamps, having only 9 percent left. On the last day, 97 percent of all benefits are spent.
Cole and Lee (2005) also find that the food stamp redemption patterns vary very little
across states, community characteristics, and household characteristics. Additionally,
the patterns appear to be relatively stable over time (U.S. Department of Agriculture
2006).
Going beyond the analysis of expenditure patterns, Shapiro (2005) provides further ev-
idence for the monthly variation in food stamp households’ financial circumstances.
He exploits plausibly exogenous variation in the time since the last food stamp receipt
across individuals in survey data such that his results are unlikely to be driven by unob-
served heterogeneity. In addition to a decline in food expenses as the food stamp cycle
progresses, Shapiro (2005) estimates that the caloric intake of food stamp household
members goes down by 10 to 15 percent between the beginning and end of the cycle.
Furthermore, he finds evidence that the food stamp recipients’ desperation for money
rises over the monthly cycle: the more days that have passed since the last food stamp
payment, the more likely they are to hypothetically accept less than $50 today versus
$50 dollars in a month. At the same time, the smallest amount of cash that they would be
willing to accept today decreases over the cycle. When asked about their willingness to
accept less than $50 today versus $50 in a week, his analysis yields that the food stamp
households have a higher probability of accepting the option of less than $50 today in
the last week of the cycle compared with the rest of the food stamp cycle.
In sum, the results of the studies discussed indicate that the financial resources of food
stamp households decrease as the monthly food stamp cycle progresses, leading to par-
ticularly poor financial circumstances at the end of the cycle.7
1.3 Empirical Strategy
This section explains the empirical strategy to estimate the short-run effect of the finan-
cial scarcity at the end of the food stamp cycle on self-assessed physical health. The
7This notion is further supported by a large qualitative study of the lives of food stamp recipients by
Edin et al. (2013).
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strategy exploits the random interview day assignment in ATUS and the variation in
food stamp issuance periods across states. The next section subsequently describes the
data I use in more detail and reports the results from randomization checks.
ATUS does not contain the actual day when a food stamp recipient receives his or her
food stamps. For this reason, I select all food stamp recipients from the states that
issue all of their food stamps early in the month for the first estimation approach. I
call this group of states the early states and define a state to be an early state if its food
stamp issuance period starts before the fifth day of each month and lasts at most ten
days.8 Table A.1 in the appendix lists all of the early states. Due to the payment of food
stamp benefits early in the month, I know that in the early states the food stamp cycle
coincides approximately with the actual calendar month. Therefore, I also know that
the individuals in the early states experience financial scarcity approximately at the end
of the calendar month.
The first estimation approach, which I call early states approach, thus compares food
stamp recipients from the early states interviewed at the end of the calendar month with
food stamp recipients from the same states not interviewed at the end of the calendar
month. I call the latter period the beginning of the month.9 The regression equation that
I estimate using a linear probability model is:
yi = α + β endi + γXi + εi, (1.1)
where yi is a dummy that equals one if individual i reports fair or poor physical health
and zero otherwise, i.e., if i reports excellent, very good or good physical health. The
dummy variable endi is equal to one if individual i was interviewed at the end of the
month, which I define in the main specification as the last ten days of the calendar
month, and zero otherwise. To improve precision and assert that the randomization
8When defining the early states, there is a trade-off between restricting the food stamp issuance period
to a smaller time window at the beginning of the month and sample size. My early states definition tries
to balance this trade-off. Section 1.7 shows that the main results are robust to an alternative early states
definition.
9Because the individuals’ food stamp cycle only approximately coincides with the calendar month,
there may be individuals in the end-of-month group that have not actually reached the end of their monthly
cycle, and vice versa. This may bias the effect estimates towards zero.
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procedure of the survey worked out well, Equation (1.1) also contains a vector of control
variables Xi. Apart from standard demographic variables, Xi includes dummies for
individual i’s weight based on the Body Mass Index (BMI) and a dummy for whether he
or she is disabled. Additionally, Vector Xi contains year×month and state of residence
dummies as well as a dummy for whether the interview took place on the weekend.
The notes for Table 1.3 list all of the covariates. εi is the zero-mean error term. The
standard errors are clustered at the state–quarter level.10 The coefficient of interest is β,
which corresponds to the effect of the end-of-cycle financial scarcity on the probability
of reporting fair or poor physical health.
In general, one major threat to obtaining an unbiased estimate for the effect of interest
using Equation (1.1) is selection based on unobserved individual characteristics. For ex-
ample, if individuals interviewed at the end of the month are generally more pessimistic
about their health or have generally worse health, inducing them to assess their health
to be worse compared with those interviewed at the beginning of the month, then the
effect estimate may be upward biased, suggesting a more detrimental effect of financial
scarcity than is actually the case. However, because the individuals used in the anal-
ysis are randomly assigned to the interview period, resulting from the interview day
randomization in ATUS, this type of selection does not threaten the estimation. The
random assignment breaks all correlations between the end-of-month dummy and char-
acteristics of individuals that may determine their self-assessed physical health apart
from the experience of financial scarcity. However, if there are factors other than finan-
cial scarcity that differ systematically between the end of the month and the beginning
of the month, and which affect self-assessed physical health, then the estimation based
on Equation (1.1) will give misleading results. One such factor could be, for example,
that individuals interviewed at the end of the month are exhausted from a long month’s
work, inducing them to report worse health than they would have reported otherwise if
interviewed earlier in the month.
To account for such potential factors, I extend the early states approach using a difference-
in-differences (DID) approach. The DID approach additionally protects against bias that
could result from an imperfect random interview period assignment that is the same for
10The conclusions from the main analysis are robust to clustering at alternative levels, such as at the
state–month level, and to using unclustered (heteroscedasticity-consistent) standard errors.
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the treatment and control group. However, the randomization checks indicate that im-
perfect randomization is unlikely to be a concern in the estimations.
The idea of the DID approach is to compare the ‘beginning of the month–end of the
month’ change in self-assessed physical health between the food stamp recipients from
the early states and a suitable control group that is unlikely to experience scarcity at the
end of the month, which I describe below. The regression equation that I estimate via
OLS is:
yi = α + δ endi + η fsp earlyi + β endi × fsp earlyi + γXi + εi, (1.2)
where, as in the early states approach, yi is a dummy that is equal to one if individual
i reports fair or poor physical health and zero otherwise and dummy endi equals one
if individual i is interviewed in the last ten days of the month and zero otherwise. The
dummy fsp earlyi takes on the value one if individual i is a food stamp recipient from
the early states and zero otherwise. Vector Xi contains the same variables as for the
early states approach. εi is the zero-mean error term and the standard errors are again
clustered at the state–quarter level. Coefficient β is the effect of interest.
For estimations based on Equation (1.2) to yield an unbiased effect estimate, the crucial
assumption that is required to hold is the parallel trends assumption. In the present
case, the assumption states that the individuals from the early states would experience
the same average change in self-assessed health between the beginning of the month
and end of the month in the absence of scarcity as the average change in self-assessed
health between the beginning of the month and end of the month for the control group
(conditional on Xi). When thinking about control groups for which the parallel trends
assumption may hold, two groups of individuals come especially to mind. I estimate
Equation (1.2) with both of these groups separately.
The first control group consists of all of the food stamp recipients that are not from the
early states. As Table A.1 in the appendix shows, many of the non-early states stagger
their food stamp issuance over a longer time span than the early states. For this reason, I
call this group of states the staggering states. In addition, many of the staggering states
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start issuing food stamps more towards the middle of the month and thus a bit later than
the early states. The greater staggering and later food stamp issuance implies that the
time since the last food stamp receipt does not change as much on average between
the beginning of the month and end of month for the individuals from the staggering
states as for the individuals from the early states, and that in neither of the two periods
of the month the food stamp cycle for the staggering states’ individuals has on average
reached its very end. The group of food stamp recipients from the staggering states
is, therefore, on average not only at the beginning of the month but also at the end of
the month unlikely to experience the financial scarcity that the group of food stamp
recipients from the early states has to face at the end of the month. At the same time, it
may be plausible that the parallel trends assumption holds because both groups consist
of individuals who participate in the FSP.
The second control group consists of all non-food stamp recipients from the early states.
As non-food stamp recipients are on average wealthier than food stamp recipients, it is
unlikely that they experience the financial scarcity of the food stamp recipients. At the
same time, it could be argued that the parallel trends assumption is fulfilled because
both groups come from the early states.
If there truly are factors other than the experience of financial scarcity that vary system-
atically between the beginning of the month and end of the month, then it is a priori
not clear which of the two DID estimations yields more reliable effect estimates. This
is because the estimations based on the two controls groups need not necessarily give
similar results and because there is uncertainty about which of the two control groups
is more suitable. If there are no such alternative factors present, however, then the DID
approach using either of the two control groups, and the early states approach, should
yield similar and valid effect estimates. The estimations below suggest that the latter
situation is the case.
17
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL SCARCITY AND HEALTH
1.4 Data
1.4.1 American Time Use Survey
For the empirical analysis, I use data from the American Time Use Survey. ATUS data
are well suited for investigating the research question of interest. The survey contains
information on food stamp receipt and self-assessed physical health (for selected years),
and, unlike any other potentially suitable survey, it assigns individuals randomly to their
interview day. The random interview day assignment allows me to adopt the outlined
estimation strategy.
The main purpose of ATUS is to obtain nationally representative estimates of how indi-
viduals in the United States spend their time. The survey is conducted by the US Census
Bureau and is sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since 2003, annual ATUS
waves are available, in most years containing 12,000–13,000 observations.
ATUS is based on a random sample drawn from the households that have recently fin-
ished their last interview for the Current Population Survey (CPS). From every drawn
household, one household member aged 15 or older is randomly selected to be ques-
tioned in ATUS. The interview is conducted via telephone and takes place 2–5 months
after the last CPS interview. The interview day is randomly assigned, using a procedure
that can be described as follows. For a given designated respondent, the month of the
interview is randomly selected. In this month, then the interview week and subsequently
the day of the week are randomly selected.11 Each designated respondent is notified in
advance about the day when the interview is scheduled to take place. If an individual is
unable to do the interview on the specified date, then he or she will be contacted on the
same weekday as the one of the originally planned interview day in the following up to
seven weeks. Each ATUS respondent is interviewed only once.
Apart from information about how individuals use their time, ATUS includes limited
demographic information. The survey can be linked to the CPS, which increases the
11The random assignment is performed so that the number of designated respondents is evenly spread
across the weeks of the year and so that 25 percent of all respondents are allocated to a Sunday and
Monday, respectively, and 10 percent to every other day of the week. The respondents are asked about
their time use the day before the interview. The day of the week allocation thus implies that 50 percent of
all individuals report about a weekend day.
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number of variables available. Additionally, in 2006–2008, all ATUS respondents were
asked to assess their physical health as part of the supplementary Eating and Health
module, which contains a small number of health-related questions. The wording of
the question is ‘In general, would you say that your physical health is Excellent, Very
Good, Good, Fair, or Poor?’ The module also asked the respondents whether they or
anyone else in their household received food stamp benefits in the past 30 days. I refer
to individuals who answer this question with ‘yes’ as food stamp recipients.
1.4.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis sample consists of data from the ATUS waves 2006–2008, which contain
the required variables, supplemented by data from the respondents’ last CPS interview.
For the sample, I select all individuals that belong to one of the three groups used in the
empirical strategy and who do not have missing information for the analysis variables.
This selection procedure yields 1,322 food stamp recipients from the early states, 997
food stamp recipients from the staggering states, and 18,592 non-food stamp recipients
from the early states.12 In all three groups, the observations are evenly distributed across
the three years.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main analysis for
each of the three groups of individuals separately. The table indicates that the two
groups of food stamp recipients are overall very similar. The only notable differences
in variable means are a nine percentage points lower share of black people and an eight
percentage points higher share of individuals living in metropolitan areas for the recipi-
ents from the early states relative to the recipients from the staggering states.
Conversely, the non-food stamp recipients are quite different from the food stamp re-
cipients. This is not surprising considering that the FSP especially targets low-income
individuals. Comparing the means for the three groups shows that, for example, the
food stamp recipients are overall less educated, have a higher share of disabled peo-
ple and fewer of them are employed. Additionally, in food stamp households there is
12Due to missing values, I dropped approximately 11, 14, and 9 percent of all food stamp recipients
from the early states, food stamp recipients from the staggering states, and non-food stamp recipients
from the early states, respectively.
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Groups of Individuals Used in the Analysis
Non-food
Food stamp recipients stamp recipients
Early states Staggering states Early states
Standard Standard Standard
Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
Outcome variable
Fair or poor physical health 0.399 0.490 0.415 0.493 0.144 0.351
Regressor of interest
End 0.303 0.460 0.305 0.461 0.298 0.457
Individual characteristics
Age in years 43.107 16.620 44.720 17.150 46.382 17.210
Black 0.269 0.443 0.360 0.480 0.108 0.310
Male 0.287 0.452 0.302 0.459 0.467 0.499
Employed 0.368 0.482 0.392 0.488 0.682 0.466
Retired 0.113 0.316 0.131 0.338 0.154 0.361
Disabled 0.257 0.437 0.243 0.429 0.031 0.174
Less than high school 0.319 0.466 0.332 0.471 0.138 0.345
High school 0.363 0.481 0.381 0.486 0.252 0.434
Some college 0.181 0.385 0.166 0.373 0.182 0.386
College 0.119 0.324 0.111 0.315 0.304 0.460
Advanced degree 0.018 0.134 0.009 0.095 0.123 0.329
Underweight 0.021 0.144 0.018 0.133 0.016 0.127
Normalweight 0.300 0.459 0.262 0.440 0.375 0.484
Overweight 0.305 0.461 0.306 0.461 0.360 0.480
Obese 0.374 0.484 0.414 0.493 0.249 0.433
Household characteristics
Spouse/partner present
in household
0.282 0.450 0.292 0.455 0.551 0.497
Low-income household 0.883 0.322 0.888 0.316 0.251 0.433
No. of adults in household 1.711 0.912 1.696 0.848 1.883 0.775
No. of children in household 1.356 1.394 1.345 1.420 0.891 1.113
Metropolitan area 0.739 0.439 0.814 0.389 0.814 0.389
Observations 1,322 997 18,592
Notes: Author’s calculations based on 2006–2008 ATUS data supplemented by CPS data. The outcome variable fair or poor
physical health equals one if the individual reports fair or poor physical health and zero if the individual reports excellent, very
good, or good physical health. The dummy end is one if the individual is interviewed in the last ten days of the month and zero
otherwise. The dummy low-income household equals one if the individual lives in a household with a monthly gross income equal
to or below 185 percent of the poverty line and zero otherwise. The weight dummies based on the classification of the World
Health Organization (2000) take on the value one if the following conditions hold and zero otherwise: Underweight: BMI<18.5;
normalweight: 18.5≤BMI<25; overweight: 25≤BMI<30; obese: BMI≥30. Age in years takes on the value 80 for individuals
aged 80 through 84 and the value 85 for individuals aged 85 and above. In all regression models controlling for age, I additionally
include age squared as a covariate. The dummies black, male, disabled, metropolitan area, and the five education dummies were
measured at the last CPS interview. All other listed variables were measured at the ATUS interview.
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less often a partner or spouse present and the number of children is on average higher.
There is also a marked difference in the mean for the outcome variable. The share of
food stamp recipients assessing their physical health as fair or poor as opposed to good,
very good, or excellent is approximately 40 percent. The corresponding share for the
non-food stamp recipients is only about 14 percent.
To assess the notion that overall neither of the two groups of food stamp recipients
experiences financial scarcity at the beginning of the month and that only the group of
food stamp recipients from the early states experiences financial scarcity at the end of
the month, Figure 1.1 displays the distribution of the mean number of days since the
last food stamp receipt for both groups of food stamp recipients and both periods of the
month.13
Panel A suggests that most of the food stamp recipients interviewed at the beginning
of the calendar month from both groups have not yet reached the end of their monthly
food stamp cycle. The mean time since the last food stamp receipt averaged over all
individuals is 12.34 days for the recipients from the early states and 14.76 days for the
recipients from the staggering states. Furthermore, only 9 percent of the early states’
and only 14 percent of the staggering states’ recipients have a mean time since their last
food stamp receipt of 21 days, i.e., three weeks, or more.
Conversely, Panel B suggests that the food stamp cycle has progressed considerably
further for the recipients from the early states interviewed at the end of the calendar
month relative to their counterparts interviewed at the beginning of the month. The
mean time since the last food stamp receipt averaged over all the early states’ recipients
is now 22.08 days, and 62 percent of these individuals have a mean time since the last
food stamp receipt of at least 21 days. The food stamp cycle is also at a more advanced
stage for the staggering states’ recipients interviewed at the end of the calendar month,
even though less so than for the recipients from the early states. The averaged mean time
since the last food stamp receipt is 17.99 days and only for 26 percent of all individuals
from the staggering states the mean time since the last food stamp receipt is at least 21
13 I compute the mean days since the last food stamp receipt for individual i by taking the average
distance between i’s interview day and each possible day he or she could have received his or her last
food stamps based on the food stamp issuance dates for his or her state of residence. I use this relatively
imprecise measure because I do not observe the actual individual food stamp delivery days.
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Figure 1.1. Distribution of the Mean Number of Days since the Last Food Stamp Receipt
Panel A. Beginning of the Month
Panel B. End of the Month
Notes: The bandwidth is selected according to Silverman’s rule of thumb. All individuals interviewed in the last ten days of the
calendar month belong to the group ‘end of the month’. All other individuals belong to the group ‘beginning of the month’. See
Footnote 13 for how I compute the mean days since the last food stamp receipt for a given individual.
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days.
In sum, the insights from Figure 1.1 support the notion exploited in the empirical strat-
egy. The food stamp cycle for the group of food stamp recipients from the early states
coincides approximately with the calendar month and the group of food stamp recipi-
ents from the staggering states has not yet reached the end of the food stamp cycle in
either of the two periods of the month.
1.4.3 Randomization Checks
In the following, I assess whether the interview period randomization, which results
from the interview day randomization in ATUS, is successful in balancing the charac-
teristics between the individuals interviewed at the beginning of the month and at the
end of the month. An imperfect interview period randomization could threaten the va-
lidity of the empirical analysis.
Table 1.2 reports means for individual and household characteristics by period of the
month for the three groups of individuals used in the analysis. In addition, the table
displays p-values from t-tests, testing for differences in means by period of the month
for each listed variable, and F -tests, testing whether all mean differences within each
group are jointly equal to zero. For each of the three groups, the table shows that there
are overall only small differences in means between the individuals interviewed at the
beginning of the month and at the end of the month. For 57 out of the 60 pairwise mean
comparisons, the t-tests fail to reject the hypothesis of equal means at the 10 percent
level.14 Furthermore, the F -tests are far from rejecting that all mean differences within
each group are jointly equal to zero at the 10 percent level, as the second to last row in
the table shows. The corresponding p-values are 0.853, 0.475, and 0.652. The balance
checks in Table 1.2 thus suggest that the interview period randomization successfully
balances the characteristics between the two periods of the month.
14The three exceptions are as follows: for the food stamp recipients from the staggering states, the 5.7
percentage point difference in the share of retired people is significant at the 5 percent level; and for the
non-food stamp recipients, the 0.5 year age difference and 1.4 percentage point difference in the share of
individuals who have a normal weight is significant at the 10 percent level. The set of covariates in the
estimations includes these three variables.
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Additionally, note that the DID approach protects against bias due to imperfect random
interview period assignment that is the same for the food stamp recipients from the early
states and the respective control group. For this reason, especially an imperfect inter-
view period randomization specific to one of the three groups used in the analysis could
pose a threat to the validity of the estimations. For example, one could be concerned
that especially food stamp recipients from the early states do not want to participate in
the survey at the end of the month, due to financial scarcity. However, the means for the
dummy variable end in Table 1.1 indicate that almost exactly 30 percent of all individ-
uals in each of the three groups are interviewed at the end of the month. Group-specific
interview period selection is, therefore, unlikely to threaten the validity of the analy-
sis, considering these almost identical shares in addition to the findings of the balance
checks.15
1.5 Main Results
Table 1.3 presents the main estimates for the short-run effect of the financial scarcity at
the end of the food stamp cycle on self-assessed physical health.
Column (1) reports the effect estimate from the early states approach, which compares
the food stamp recipients from the early states interviewed at the beginning and end
of the calendar month, without controls. The estimation yields that the experience of
financial scarcity increases the probability of reporting fair or poor physical health by
5.3 percentage points. The estimate is significant at the 10 percent level. Adding the
control variables to the model in Column (2) increases the estimate moderately to 7.2
percentage points. The R2 goes up considerably, from 0.003 to 0.342, and the effect
estimate becomes more precisely estimated, being now significant at the 1 percent level.
Columns (3)–(6) report the main estimates from the DID approach, using as a control
group a group of individuals that is unlikely to experience financial scarcity at the end
of the calendar month.
In the DID models, the coefficient on the dummy variable end gives the change in the
15The shares are also close to the share of individuals assigned to the end-of-month period among all
designated ATUS respondents, which is 29 percent.
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Table 1.3. Estimates for the Effect of Financial Scarcity on Self-Assessed Physical
Health
Early states approach Difference-in-differences approach
Control group
Staggering states Early states non-
food stamp recipients food stamp recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
End 0.053∗ 0.072∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002
(0.027) (0.022) (0.032) (0.025) (0.006) (0.005)
Fsp early – – −0.034 −0.033 0.238∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014)
Fsp early × end – – 0.059 0.076∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.034) (0.030) (0.024)
Individual
controls
X X X
Household
controls
X X X
Time controls X X X
State controls X X
R2 0.003 0.342 0.002 0.296 0.030 0.241
Observations 1,322 1,322 2,319 2,319 19,914 19,914
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state–quarter level are in parentheses. The estimations are based on 2006–2008 ATUS
data supplemented by CPS data. All models are estimated via OLS. The outcome variable is a dummy variable that equals one
for individual i if i reports fair or poor physical health and zero otherwise. The dummy end equals one for individual i if i was
interviewed in the last ten days of the calendar month and zero otherwise. Fsp early is one for individual i if i is a food stamp
recipient from the early states and zero otherwise. The set of individual controls consists of the variables listed under individual
characteristics in Table 1.1. The dummies college and normalweight are omitted due to multicollinearity, and age squared is
additionally added. The set of household controls consists of the variables listed under household characteristics in Table 1.1. The
time controls are a full set of year×month dummies and a dummy that equals one for individual i if i’s interview took place on
the weekend and zero otherwise. The state controls are dummies for each state. For the food stamp recipients from the early states
interviewed at the beginning of the month, the probability of reporting fair or poor physical health is 0.383.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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probability of reporting bad physical health between the beginning and the end of the
month for each of the two respective control groups. For either of the control groups,
with and without controls, the estimated coefficient is far from significant at the 10
percent level and is close to zero. This suggests that there are no factors other than
the experience of financial scarcity that influence the individuals’ self-assessed physical
health at the end of the month.
The interaction term fsp early×end gives the financial scarcity effect estimate in the
DID estimations. Using the food stamp recipients from the staggering states as the
control group, the estimated effect without controls is 5.9 percentage points; however
this is imprecisely estimated. After adding controls, the estimate becomes significant
at the 5 percent level and is now 7.6 percentage points. The DID model that uses the
non-food stamp recipients from the early states as the control group yields an effect
estimate of 5.6 percentage points without controls, which is significant at the 10 percent
level. With control variables, the model gives an estimate of 6.7 percentage points, and
is significant at the 1 percent level. The DID estimates with and without controls are
thus very similar to their corresponding estimates from the early states approach. This
could already be expected, considering the small estimated changes in the probability
of reporting bad physical health between the beginning and end of the month for both
control groups.
In summary, all of the specifications from both estimation approaches indicate a detri-
mental short-run effect of the end-of-cycle financial scarcity on self-assessed physical
health. After adding controls, the regressions yield that the financial scarcity increases
the probability of reporting fair or poor physical health by around seven percentage
points. The probability of reporting fair or poor physical health for the food stamp re-
cipients from the early states interviewed at the beginning of the month is 38.3 percent.
Relative to this baseline probability, the effect appears quite sizable, corresponding to
an increase of around 18 percent.
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1.6 Potential Mechanisms
This section discusses two potential mechanisms through which the food stamp recip-
ients’ financial scarcity may affect self-assessed physical health. One potential mech-
anism for the effect could be that the experience of financial scarcity increases the in-
dividuals’ levels of stress. Indeed, Edin et al. (2013) found evidence that the lack of
financial resources may be a stressful experience for many food stamp recipients, and
a number of studies have found that stress may lead to negative health consequences,
such as headaches and back pain (see Benson and Proctor 2010). Anecdotal evidence
from a Washington Post article further supports the notion that stress could be a relevant
mechanism (see Saslow 2013). The article is about a food stamp recipient who reports
getting anxiety headaches at the end of the monthly food stamp cycle when her financial
resources are exhausted. Unfortunately, ATUS does not contain any direct measure of
stress to explore this mechanism. However, the survey does include the time use cate-
gory ‘sleeplessness’, which captures the reported number of minutes that an individual
was sleepless on the day before the interview. Examples for the category include lying
awake and tossing and turning.16 A number of studies have documented associations be-
tween stress and sleep difficulties (see, e.g., Åkerstedt 2006; Kahn et al. 2013). Thus, if
stress is a mechanism for the financial scarcity effect, then a positive impact of financial
scarcity on individuals’ reported sleeplessness may seem plausible.17
Table 1.4 presents estimates for the effect of financial scarcity on reported sleeplessness
from regressions that are analogous to the ones in the main analysis. Panel A shows that
the estimated financial scarcity effect on the probability of reporting any sleeplessness is
positive and significant at conventional levels in all estimations. Each regression yields a
similar effect estimate between around three and four percentage points. This magnitude
appears sizable, with about 49 to 66 percent relative to the 6.1 percent probability of
reporting any sleeplessness for the food stamp recipients from the early states at the
beginning of the month. Panel B gives estimates for the financial scarcity effect on
16It appears unlikely that individuals are generally able to recall the exact number of minutes that
they were sleepless. Nevertheless, the reported sleeplessness may still serve as a rough measure for
individuals’ actual amount of time that they spent in sleeplessness.
17A lack of sleep has also been found to be associated with worse health (see, e.g., Dinges et al. 1997;
Paiva et al. 2015). A potential effect of financial scarcity on self-assessed physical health via increased
stress could, therefore, also go through sleeplessness itself.
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Table 1.4. Estimates for the Effect of Financial Scarcity on Reported Sleeplessness
Early states approach Difference-in-differences approach
Control group
Staggering states Early states non-
food stamp recipients food stamp recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Outcome: Dummy equal to 1 if an individual reports any sleeplessness
End 0.034∗∗ 0.040∗∗ −0.008 −0.011 −0.003 −0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Fsp early – – −0.010 −0.013 0.010 −0.013
(0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
Fsp early × end – – 0.042∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017)
R2 0.004 0.088 0.002 0.032 0.001 0.012
Panel B. Outcome: Number of minutes of reported sleeplessness
End 5.704∗∗ 5.863∗∗ −0.045 −0.150 −0.301 −0.347
(2.367) (2.313) (1.839) (1.770) (0.427) (0.423)
Fsp early – – −1.132 −1.272 0.729 −2.144∗∗
(1.440) (1.525) (0.873) (1.034)
Fsp early × end – – 5.748∗ 5.883∗∗ 6.004∗∗ 6.186∗∗
(2.995) (2.928) (2.389) (2.373)
R2 0.006 0.071 0.004 0.034 0.001 0.017
Individual
controls
X X X
Household
controls
X X X
Time controls X X X
State controls X X
Observations 1,322 1,322 2,319 2,319 19,914 19,914
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state–quarter level are in parentheses. The estimations are based on 2006–2008 ATUS data
supplemented by CPS data. All models are estimated via OLS. The dummy end equals one for individual i if i was interviewed in
the last ten days of the calendar month and zero otherwise. Fsp early is one for individual i if i is a food stamp recipient from the
early states and zero otherwise. For a description of the control variables, see the notes for Table 1.3. For the food stamp recipients
from the early states interviewed at the beginning of the month, the probability of reporting any sleeplessness is 0.061 and the
average number of minutes of reported sleeplessness is 4.643.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
29
CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL SCARCITY AND HEALTH
the number of minutes that an individual reports being sleepless. In all regressions,
the estimated effect is approximately six minutes. This corresponds to a 130 percent
increase relative to the average minutes of sleeplessness of 4.64 for the food stamp
recipients from the early states at the beginning of the month. All of the estimates are
significant at conventional levels. The findings in Table 1.4 thus suggest that increased
stress may indeed be a mechanism through which the financial scarcity at the end of the
food stamp cycle affects self-assessed physical health.
Considering that the FSP targets individuals that are threatened by food insecurity, an-
other mechanism for the effect of interest may be that the food stamp recipients expe-
rience hunger due to not having enough food as a result of the financial scarcity. This
could lead to symptoms such as stomach ache and dizziness. As discussed in Section
1.2.2, Shapiro (2005) estimates a decline in caloric intake for food stamp recipients be-
tween the beginning and end of the monthly food stamp cycle. This finding suggests that
hunger could also play a role. Unfortunately, ATUS does not include any suitable mea-
sure for hunger. A closer investigation of this potential mechanism may thus provide a
fruitful opportunity for future research.18
18Regressions for the effect of financial scarcity on the time use category ‘eating and drinking’ yield
estimates that are close to zero and, except in one case, are insignificant at the 10 percent level. This
finding could be interpreted as evidence against hunger being a relevant mechanism. However, this finding
could, for example, also result from the situation that individuals take more time to eat a possibly smaller
amount of available food, potentially still being hungry. The estimates for the time spent eating and
drinking, therefore, do not appear to provide conclusive evidence on the hunger mechanism. The time
use category ‘eating and drinking’ cannot be divided into eating and drinking separately.
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1.7 Robustness Analysis and Placebo Tests
1.7.1 Robustness Analysis
All of the main estimations, using two different approaches and two different control
groups, yield similar results. To increase the confidence in the findings from the main
analysis further, I assess the robustness of the estimates to alternative model specifica-
tions.
One concern could be that the estimates may be sensitive to the definition of the end-
of-month period. To address this issue, I re-estimate the models from the main analysis
using alternative end-of-month definitions. Table 1.5 presents estimates where I increase
and decrease, respectively, the end-of-month window by three days relative to the origi-
nal ten day definition. The table shows that the effect estimates remain quite stable and,
if anything, generally behave as one might expect. For example, Column (2) gives that
the estimated effect, based on the early states approach, decreases from 7.2 percentage
points in the main specification to 5.3 percentage points when using the last 13 days of
the month as the end-of-month definition. This moderate decrease appears plausible, as
increasing the end-of-month window from ten to 13 days likely decreases the share of
individuals experiencing financial scarcity in the end-of-month period.
The only effect estimate that loses significance at conventional levels is the estimate in
Column (3) from the DID approach that uses the food stamp recipients from the stagger-
ing states as the control group and the last seven days of the month as the end-of-month
definition. Nevertheless, the 5.0 percentage point estimate still indicates the presence
of the financial scarcity effect. The decrease in the estimate relative to the correspond-
ing one from the main specifications also appears plausible and may be explained as
follows. As the end-of-month window becomes narrower, the share of food stamp re-
cipients from the staggering states that experience financial scarcity in the end-of-month
period likely increases, which leads the DID approach to underestimate the effect of in-
terest. This notion is supported by the increased and now positive, yet still insignificant,
change in the probability of reporting bad health between the beginning and end of the
month for the staggering states’ food stamp recipients, which is given by the coefficient
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Table 1.5. Robustness Checks Using Alternative End-of-Month Definitions
Early states approach Difference-in-differences approach
Control group
Staggering states Early states non-
food stamp recipients food stamp recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fsp early – – −0.021 −0.038∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016)
Last 7 days of month
End7 0.071∗∗ – 0.024 – −0.004 –
(0.027) (0.031) (0.005)
Fsp early × end7 – – 0.050 – 0.063∗∗ –
(0.041) (0.027)
Last 13 days of month
End13 – 0.053∗∗ – −0.013 – −0.003
(0.026) (0.024) (0.005)
Fsp early × end13 – – – 0.068∗ – 0.056∗∗
(0.035) (0.028)
R2 0.341 0.340 0.296 0.295 0.240 0.241
Observations 1,322 1,322 2,319 2,319 19,914 19,914
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state–quarter level are in parentheses. The estimations are based on 2006–2008 ATUS data
supplemented by CPS data. All models are estimated via OLS. The outcome variable is a dummy variable that equals one for
individual i if i reports fair or poor physical health and zero otherwise. The dummy end7 (end13) equals one for individual i if i
was interviewed in the last seven (13) days of the calendar month and zero otherwise. Fsp early is one for individual i if i is a food
stamp recipient from the early states and zero otherwise. All regressions include the same control variables as the full specifications
in Table 1.3.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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estimate for the end7 dummy.
As a further robustness check, Columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 1.6 present estimates
from regressions where I include dummies for each week of the month instead of the
end-of-month dummy. Based on the early states approach, Column (2) shows that,
relative to the first week of the month, the probability of reporting fair or poor physi-
cal health rises moderately through weeks two and three, and then becomes markedly
higher with 9.1 percentage points in week four, which corresponds approximately to the
definition of the end of the month in the main specifications. Estimating the financial
scarcity effect by comparing the first and last week of the month thus increases the effect
estimate by 1.9 percentage points, relative to the corresponding estimate from the main
analysis. Only the estimate for the coefficient of the week four dummy is significant at
conventional levels. Similarly, the analogous DID models also yield significant effect
estimates that are larger than the corresponding ones from the main analysis.
In addition to the results for the specifications using week dummies, Table 1.6 displays
estimates based on an alternative early states definition in Columns (1), (3), and (6). All
states whose food stamp issuance period starts on the first day of the month and lasts at
most ten days are now defined as the group of early states. All other states are defined
as the group of staggering states. Using this alternative early states definition does not
change the effect estimates much relative to the respective main regressions and all of
the estimates remain significant at conventional levels.
1.7.2 Placebo Tests
As discussed in Section 1.3, the DID approach relies on the parallel trends assumption.
In the DID model, using the food stamp recipients from the staggering states as the
control group, one factor that would violate the parallel trends assumption would be the
presence of a trend in self-assessed physical health between the beginning and end of
the month that is specific to the individuals from the early states and staggering states,
respectively. Analogously, a trend in self-assessed physical health specific to the food
stamp recipients and non-food stamp recipients, respectively, would violate the parallel
trends assumption when using the non-food stamp recipients from the early states as the
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Table 1.6. Robustness Checks Using an Alternative Early States Definition and Week
Dummies
Early states approach Difference-in-differences approach
Control group
Staggering states Early states non-
food stamp recipients food stamp recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fsp early – – −0.018 −0.043 0.040∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.020) (0.036) (0.014) (0.027)
End 0.069∗∗∗ – 0.009 – 0.000 –
(0.023) (0.024) (0.006)
Fsp early × end – – 0.059∗ – 0.062∗∗ –
(0.034) (0.025)
Week-of-month
dummies
Week2 – 0.021 – 0.034 – 0.006
(0.034) (0.037) (0.006)
Week3 – 0.035 – −0.010 – 0.001
(0.043) (0.043) (0.006)
Week4 – 0.091∗∗∗ – 0.002 – 0.000
(0.030) (0.028) (0.007)
Fsp early × week2 – – – −0.010 – 0.012
(0.049) (0.033)
Fsp early × week3 – – – 0.040 – 0.030
(0.060) (0.042)
Fsp early × week4 – – – 0.088∗∗ – 0.076∗∗
(0.042) (0.034)
Alternative early
states definition
X X X
R2 0.341 0.342 0.295 0.296 0.237 0.241
Observations 1,181 1,322 2,319 2,319 17,638 19,914
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state–quarter level are in parentheses. The estimations are based on 2006–2008 ATUS
data supplemented by CPS data. All models are estimated via OLS. The outcome variable is a dummy variable that equals one
for individual i if i reports fair or poor physical health and zero otherwise. The dummy end equals one for individual i if i was
interviewed in the last ten days of the calendar month and zero otherwise. Fsp early is one for individual i if i is a food stamp
recipient from the early states and zero otherwise. The dummies week2, week3, week4 are equal to one for individual i if i’s
interview took place in week two, three, and four, respectively, of the calendar month and zero otherwise. Week4 includes all
remaining days after the third week of the month. All regressions include the same control variables as the full specifications in
Table 1.3. The alternative early states definition defines all states as early states that have a food stamp issuance period which starts
on the first day of the month and lasts at most ten days. All other states are defined as the staggering states.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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control group in the DID approach.
To test for such group-specific trends, and thus for the validity of the parallel trends
assumption, I conduct two placebo tests. In both tests, I estimate the DID approach
based on two groups of individuals that are unlikely to experience financial scarcity at
the end of the month, yet who would exhibit one of the two types of group-specific
trends. In the presence of group-specific trends, one would expect the regressions to
yield an estimate for the coefficient on the DID interaction term that is significantly
different from zero.
To test for trends specific to the early states and staggering states, respectively, I esti-
mate the DID model based on the non-food stamp recipients from the early states and
staggering states. To test for food stamp-/ non-food stamp recipient-specific trends, I
estimate the DID model based on the food stamp and non-food stamp recipients from
the staggering states.
Table 1.7 reports the results from the placebo tests. In each regression, the coefficient
on the interaction term early×end and fsp×end, respectively, is close to zero and far
from significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that there are no group-specific
trends present. Therefore, the placebo tests support the notion that the parallel trends as-
sumption is valid in the DID estimations. In addition, the estimates for the end dummy
coefficient are also close to zero and insignificant at the 10 percent level in all regres-
sions. The placebo tests thus not only suggest that the parallel trends assumption holds,
but also that actually none of the three placebo test groups experiences any change in
the probability of reporting bad physical health between the beginning and end of the
month.19 This increases the confidence further in the validity of the findings from the
main analysis.
19For all of the regressions, hypothesis tests also fail to reject at the 10 percent level that the two
coefficients on the variables end, early×end and end, fsp×end, respectively, are jointly equal to zero.
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Table 1.7. Placebo Tests
Comparison
Staggering states Non-food stamp recipients
Food stamp recipients – Early states –
non-food stamp recipients staggering States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
End −0.009 −0.010 −0.009 −0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Fsp 0.260∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ – –
(0.019) (0.019)
Fsp × end 0.003 −0.010 – –
(0.032) (0.026)
Early – – −0.012 −0.001
(0.007) (0.005)
Early × end – – 0.006 0.007
(0.009) (0.008)
Individual controls X X
Household controls X X
Time controls X X
State controls X
R2 0.032 0.237 0.000 0.204
Observations 14,040 14,040 31,635 31,635
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state–quarter level are in parentheses. The estimations are based on 2006–2008 ATUS
data supplemented by CPS data. All models are estimated via OLS. The outcome variable is a dummy variable that equals one
for individual i if i reports fair or poor physical health and zero otherwise. The dummy end equals one for individual i if i was
interviewed in the last ten days of the calendar month and zero otherwise. The dummy fsp is one for individual i if i is a food
stamp recipient and zero otherwise. The dummy early is one for individual i if i is from the early states and zero otherwise. For a
description of the control variables, see the notes for Table 1.3.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the short-run effect of poor financial circumstances on health,
using the variation in financial resources over the monthly food stamp cycle in a sample
of food stamp recipients. To isolate the causal effect of interest, I exploit the random
interview day assignment in the American Time Use Survey and the variation in food
stamp issuance periods across states.
The empirical analysis suggests that poor financial circumstances can indeed have neg-
ative health consequences. I find that the financial scarcity experienced by food stamp
recipients at the end of the monthly food stamp cycle increases the probability of report-
ing bad physical health by a considerable 18 percent relative to the baseline probability.
Randomization checks, robustness checks, and placebo tests support the validity of this
finding. By exploiting the time use information in ATUS, I find suggestive evidence that
increased stress may be one mechanism through which this effect occurs.
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that measures taken to alleviate poverty
may simultaneously improve the health of low-income individuals, potentially reducing
the expenditures of public health care programs such as Medicaid. Furthermore, the
results suggest that in the design of welfare programs, not only salient aspects (such as
the benefit amount) but also more subtle features (such as the timing of payments) can
be important. To mitigate particularly poor financial circumstances at the end of welfare
payment cycles and their consequences, for example, it may be beneficial to distribute
welfare payments in shorter time intervals (such as bi-weekly instead of monthly) to
help individuals smooth their consumption. In the case of the FSP, this could be a
viable option because the program issues its benefits via electronic cards. In addition,
providing assistance to welfare recipients in managing their finances could also prove
helpful to mitigate especially poor end-of-cycle financial situations. This may include
informing individuals explicitly about the exact purpose of a given welfare program to
avoid a potential misjudgment of the benefit amount. In the FSP, for example, many
households believe that their food stamps are meant to cover all of the monthly food
expenditures even though this is generally not the case (Edin et al. 2013).
The findings of this study suggest a number of avenues for future research. First, the
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effect identified in this paper corresponds to the short-run response to a temporary par-
ticularly poor financial situation. To gain a broader understanding of the link between
financial circumstances and health, it would also be important to examine the conse-
quences of more permanent poor financial circumstances and to investigate longer-run
responses. Second, it would be instructive to explore further the mechanisms behind
the estimated effect, building on the first evidence presented in this study. Third, related
to this, examining the extent to which the effect is driven by changes in more objective
health measures or changes in health perceptions, using additional health data, would
also be a fruitful subject for further research.
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Appendix A
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A.1 Additional Tables
Table A.1. Food Stamp Issuance Dates
State Monthly issuance day(s)
Early states group
Alaska 1
Arkansas 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
California 1–10
Colorado 1–10
Connecticut 1–3
District of Columbia 1–10
Hawaii 1, 3, 5a
Idaho 1–5
Indiana 1–10
Iowa 1–10
Kansas 1–10
Kentucky 1–10
Michigan 1–9
Minnesota 4–13
Montana 2–6
Nebraska 1–5
Nevada 1
New Jersey 1–5
New York 1–9b
North Carolina 3–12
North Dakota 1
Ohio 1–10
Oklahoma 1
Oregon 1–9
Rhode Island 1
South Carolina 1–10
Tennessee 1–10
Vermont 1
Virginia 1
Washington 1–10
West Virginia 1–9
Wyoming 1–4
Notes: The table continues on the next page.
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Table A.1. Continued
State Monthly issuance day(s)
Staggering states group
Alabama 4–18
Arizona 1–13
Delaware 5–11
Florida 1–15
Georgia 5–14
Illinois 1, 3, 8, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21, 23a
Louisiana 5–14
Maine 10–14
Maryland 6–15
Massachusetts 1–14
Mississippi 5–19
Missouri 1–22
New Hampshire 5
New Mexico 1–20
Pennsylvania 1-17c
South Dakota 10
Texas 1–15
Utah 5, 11, 15
Wisconsin 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15
Notes: The issuance dates are from Hamrick and Andrews (2016), who obtained the dates from the US Department of Agriculture.
All of the dates are the actual issuance days for the years 2006–2008. A state belongs to the early states group if its food stamp
issuance period starts before the fifth day of each month and lasts at most ten days. A state belongs to the staggering states group if
it does not belong to the early states group. For further details on these definitions, see Section 1.3.
a There is uncertainty in the historical records about the exact dates.
b Weighted average issuance period for NY upstate and NY City, which have differing issuance days.
c Issuance days depend on the specific month.
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Heterogeneous Effects of Poverty on
Cognition
2.1 Introduction
Many studies have documented associations between poverty and less beneficial behav-
ior. For example, the poor are less likely than those with higher incomes to make use
of preventive health services, and more likely to smoke cigarettes, play the lottery, and
borrow more often at high cost.1 Despite long-standing debates in economics and other
disciplines, the reasons for such behavior remain unclear and the topic itself controver-
sial. One recent hypothesis has focused on the financial circumstances of the poor and
the potentially detrimental impact of these on cognition: In a sample of farmers from
India, Mani et al. (2013) found that participants showed reduced cognitive performance
before harvest, when poor, compared to after harvest, when rich. The authors suggested
that a preoccupation with monetary concerns may leave the farmers before harvest with
fewer mental resources available for other processes.2
In the only other study to have investigated this hypothesis empirically to date, Carvalho
et al. (2016) assigned a sample of low-income US individuals randomly to perform a
1Use preventive health services (Ross et al. 2007), smoke cigarettes (Dube et al. 2009), play the
lottery (Clotfelter et al. 1999), borrow at high cost (Bourke et al. 2012).
2See Bertrand et al. (2004; 2006) for a discussion of alternative views on the behavior of the poor.
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number of cognitive tests before or after payday. The individuals surveyed before pay-
day faced poorer financial circumstances than those surveyed after payday. However,
the authors found no before-after differences in cognitive function in the full sample or
selected subgroups. These mixed empirical findings, and the dearth of studies on this
hypothesis in general, highlight the need to identify, at a more detailed level, the groups
of individuals in which poor financial circumstances might have detrimental effects on
cognitive function.
To contribute to this area of study, we therefore analyze heterogeneity in the effect of fi-
nancial circumstances on cognition, focusing on identifying individuals in whom poorer
financial circumstances have negative effects. To do so, we use data from the experi-
ment conducted by Caravalho et al. (2016). For our heterogeneity analysis, we use
the causal forest method by Athey et al. (2019), which was developed specifically to
explore heterogeneous treatment effects in experiments. The method can be described
as an adaptive nearest-neighbors approach that exploits ideas from the random forest
machine learning literature to determine the relevant neighborhoods for estimating con-
ditional average treatment effects at given points in the covariate space. Compared with
traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) subgroup analyses, the causal forest method al-
lows non-linear treatment effects to be estimated in a fully flexible way and circumvents
the need to specify an interacted model, which may not always be straightforward (espe-
cially when the number of covariates is large). We examine effect heterogeneity using
a rich set of 37 policy-relevant, pre-treatment covariates, including age, income, em-
ployment status, and measures of financial strain in the past. Our causal forest analysis
proceeds in the following steps: First, we investigate which covariates are particularly
relevant for heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Next, we examine how the effect
varies across the most important variables. Subsequently, we study, in greater detail, the
effect heterogeneity in regions of the covariate space where the previous step indicates
particularly detrimental effects.
The results of our analysis suggest that there is strong effect heterogeneity in the two
covariates age and income. For younger and elderly individuals who received a very
low income around the time of the experiment, we find that the poorer financial circum-
stances before payday had detrimental cognitive effects. We verify this finding using
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a second, independent, experiment conducted by Carvalho et al. (2016). Our results
provide further evidence that there may be a causal effect of poverty on cognition. They
also demonstrate the benefit of using the causal forest method to identify treatment ef-
fect heterogeneity that may have been overlooked in traditional subgroup analyses.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the experi-
ment and our analysis sample. Section 2.3 explains the causal forest method. Section
2.4 presents average effect estimates for the full sample, the results of our heterogeneity
analysis, and investigates the findings of our heterogeneity analysis in an independent
experiment. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Experiment and Data
2.2.1 Experiment
Carvalho et al. (2016) conducted their experiment twice, once among members of
the RAND American Life Panel and then again among members of the GfK Knowl-
edgePanel. Both are ongoing online panels with individuals aged 18 and over living in
the United States. The authors restricted the sample for each experiment to individuals
with an annual household income of $40,000 or less. For our analysis, we use the data
from the GfK KnowledgePanel because it had the larger sample size, and because its
share of compliers, i.e. the proportion of individuals who actually completed the survey
before payday out of all individuals assigned to the before-payday group, was much
higher. The following descriptions therefore pertain to the GfK KnowledgePanel.
The experiment consisted of a baseline survey and a follow-up survey, the former of
which was used to determine individuals’ paydays and the latter of which was used to
administer the cognitive test. Individuals were randomly assigned to receive the survey
with the cognitive test before or after payday.
In the baseline survey, individuals were asked to state all of the dates and amounts of
payments that they (and their spouse) expected to receive during a reference period from
21 November to 20 December 2014. All individuals who did not give full information
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about the number and dates of expected payments, or who reported expected payments
for more than two different dates, were dropped from the sample.3 Using this payment
information, Carvalho et al. (2016) defined each individual’s payday as follows: For in-
dividuals whose largest payment arrived at least two weeks after the previous payment,
the date of the largest payment was set as the payday. For all other individuals, the pay-
day was determined to be the payment date after the longest period without payment. If
an individual’s payments were fewer than two weeks apart, he or she was also excluded
from the experiment.
The follow-up survey opened one week before payday for individuals assigned to the
before-payday group and one day after payday for individuals assigned to the after-
payday group. Carvalho et al. (2016) found that 98 percent of all individuals assigned
to be surveyed before payday actually completed the survey before payday. Despite this
high compliance rate, we follow Carvalho et al. (2016) in our analysis and estimate
intention-to-treat effects, using the random assignment to the before-payday group as
the regressor of interest.
The cognitive test in the follow-up survey was a version of the numerical Stroop task,
which measures cognitive control. Participants are shown a number that consists of a
repeated digit (e.g., 555). Subsequently, they must state, as quickly as possible, how
many times the digit is repeated in the number rather than stating the digit itself – the
correct answer in the example being three rather than five. The experiment by Carvalho
et al. (2016) ran the Stroop task with 48 trials, and per trial each individual had, at most,
five seconds to respond – otherwise the answer to the trial was coded as incorrect.
To confirm that the individuals actually experienced poorer financial circumstances be-
fore payday than they did after payday, the follow-up survey also collected information
on individuals’ cash holdings, checking and savings accounts balances, and total ex-
penditures over the past seven days. Based on these measures, Carvalho et al. (2016)
showed that the experiment had indeed created substantial variation in financial cir-
cumstances.4 Table B.1 in the appendix presents results from our estimations that are
3The latter restriction was imposed to remove individuals for whom consumption smoothing may be
easier.
4This finding is in line with previous research, which documented a sharp increase in caloric intake
and expenditures at payday for certain groups of individuals (see, e.g., Mastrobuoni and Weinberg 2009;
45
CHAPTER 2. POVERTY AND COGNITION
analogous to Carvalho et al.’s (2016) for financial circumstances. These estimations
yield very similar variation in financial circumstances in our sample, which is slightly
smaller than Carvalho et al.’s (2016) sample, as explained in the next section.
2.2.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
For our analysis sample, we select all of the 2,723 individuals who were in Carvalho et
al.’s (2016) full KnowledgePanel sample and subsequently drop all observations that are
missing information on any of our analysis variables.5 This selection procedure yields
a sample of 2,480 individuals.
Table 2.1 presents the definitions and descriptive statistics for the cognition outcomes
and treatment indicator. Our main outcome of interest is the number of correct answers
per second that individual i gave over the entire Stroop task. This outcome captures
the essence of the Stroop task’s goal, which is to give correct answers to all trials as
quickly as possible. Moreover, to gain an understanding of where the effect on our
main outcome comes from, we include the numerator and denominator of our main
outcome as additional outcomes: the number of correct answers over all 48 trials and
the total time it took individual i to complete the entire Stroop task.6 Table 2.1 shows
that, on average, the individuals in our sample gave approximately 0.45 correct answers
per second, provided about 43 correct answers in total (thereby responding correctly
to most of the trials), and took approximately 100 seconds to finish the whole Stroop
task. The mean for our regressor of interest, which is a dummy that is equal to one if
an individual was randomly assigned to be surveyed before payday and zero otherwise,
is almost exactly 50 percent. This is as expected considering the experiment’s random
assignment of individuals to the before-payday or after-payday group.
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the 37 covariates that we include in our het-
erogeneity analysis. All of these were collected before the follow-up survey, in which
Shapiro 2005; Stephens 2003; 2006).
5Additionally, we drop all individuals who were above the 0.99 quantile of the current income distri-
bution in our full sample to remove potentially erroneous values. Given the definitions of our outcomes
below, we also drop individuals who have missing information for any of the Stroop task’s trials, i.e., who
did not participate in all 48 trials of the task.
6Carvalho et al. (2016) conducted their Stroop task analysis at the individual×trial level, using the
outcomes response time per trial and a dummy which is one if an individual answered a trial correctly.
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Table 2.1. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Outcomes and Regressor of
Interest
Standard
Definition Mean deviation
Outcomes
Correct answers per second Number of correct answers that
individual i gave across all 48
Stroop task trials divided by the
total time in seconds that it took
i to complete the entire Stroop
task.
0.446 0.143
Number of correct answers Number of correct answers that
individual i gave across all 48
trials of the Stroop task.
42.899 10.565
Total response time in seconds Total time in seconds that it
took individual i to complete
the entire Stroop task.
100.476 22.816
Regressor of interest
Before payday = 1 if individual i was assigned
to be surveyed before payday.
0.509 0.500
Notes: N = 2, 480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016).
the Stroop task was administered.7 These covariates give information on many policy-
relevant characteristics, such as an individual’s race, education, employment status, and
financial strain in the past. In addition to the annual household income at the time of
the baseline survey, we include a measure of the (household) income that an individ-
ual received around the time of the experiment. We call this measure current income
and construct it as the sum of all payments that an individual (and his or her spouse)
expected to receive during the experiment’s reference period (21 November to 20 De-
cember 2014).
Overall, Table 2.2 suggests that many individuals in the sample were of low socioeco-
nomic status. For example, 41.4 percent of them had experienced financial hardship
in the past 12 months, and almost half stated that they were living from paycheck to
paycheck. Also, the annual household income dummies show that 41.1 percent of all
7Table B.2 in the appendix shows that the experiment’s randomization procedure was successful in
balancing the analysis covariates between the individuals interviewed before and after payday.
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individuals had an annual household income of less than $20,000, and an average cur-
rent income of approximately $1738.
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Covariates
Mean Standard deviation
Age 55.947 17.423
Male 0.334 0.472
Household size 1.944 1.192
Household head 0.846 0.361
Children in household 0.167 0.373
Metropolitan area 0.804 0.397
Current income 1737.987 1321.136
Share of payday pay amount
relative to current income
0.762 0.278
Financial strain
Live from paycheck to paycheck 0.489 0.500
Caloric crunch 0.470 0.499
Liquidity constrained 0.503 0.500
Financial hardship 0.414 0.493
Marital status
Married 0.335 0.472
Divorced 0.276 0.447
Widowed 0.139 0.346
Never married 0.250 0.433
Race
White 0.761 0.426
Black 0.100 0.300
Hispanic 0.082 0.274
Other race 0.057 0.232
Notes: N = 2, 480. The table continues on the next page.
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Table 2.2 Continued
Mean Standard deviation
Employment status
Working 0.287 0.452
Unemployed 0.063 0.244
Disabled 0.199 0.399
Retired 0.388 0.487
Other employment status 0.062 0.242
Education
Less than high school 0.063 0.244
High school 0.254 0.435
Some college 0.417 0.493
College 0.266 0.442
Annual household income
Less than $5,000 0.048 0.215
Between $5,000 and $10,000 0.100 0.300
Between $10,000 and $15,000 0.143 0.350
Between $15,000 and $20,000 0.120 0.325
Between $20,000 and $25,000 0.149 0.356
Between $25,000 and $30,000 0.143 0.350
Between $30,000 and $35,000 0.140 0.347
Between $35,000 and $40,000 0.156 0.363
Notes: N = 2, 480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). The dummy category other
race also includes individuals of mixed ethnicity; unemployed also includes temporarily laid off individuals, and working also
includes self-employed individuals. In the order of the four financial strain variables listed, each respective dummy equals one if
an individual i) agrees or strongly agrees with the statement ‘I live from paycheck to paycheck’, ii) had to reduce consumption at
the end of a pay cycle, iii) could not, or would have to do something drastic to, raise $2,000 in one week for an emergency, iv)
experienced at least one out of ten hardships related to not having enough money in the past 12 months. For the ten hardships, see
Table C4 in the online appendix of Carvalho et al. (2016).
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2.3 Methodology
The goal of our analysis is to study heterogeneity in the effect on cognition of poorer
financial circumstances before payday. To do so, we estimate conditional average treat-
ment effects using the causal forest method, which is based on the generalized random
forest framework by Athey et al. (2019). The method is designed for studying treat-
ment effect heterogeneity in experiments and can be described as an adaptive nearest-
neighbors approach that uses a type of random forest technique to determine the weight-
ing of observations in the estimation procedure.8 This section describes the main idea
of the causal forest. For technical details, see Athey et al. (2019).
To fix ideas, assume the following random effects model for individual i, i = 1, . . . , n:
Yi = τiDi + εi, (2.1)
where Yi is one of our cognition outcomes, εi is i’s outcome when assigned to be sur-
veyed after payday, Di is a dummy that equals one if individual i was assigned to be
surveyed before payday, and τi corresponds to the effect of the financial circumstances
before payday for individual i. Due to the random assignment of individuals to the
before-payday or after-payday group, it further holds that Di is independent of τi and
εi.
Our quantity of interest is the conditional average treatment effect τ(x) = E(τi|Xi =
x), which in our case is the average effect of the financial circumstances before payday
on cognition at a point x of the covariate vector Xi. For the estimation of τ(x), the
causal forest method exploits the independence assumption of Di and sets up two local
moment equations. In the next step, the method obtains an estimate for τ(x) by fitting
an empirical version of the local moment equations.9 This procedure yields the causal
forest estimator τ̂ (x), which can be written as:
8For an introduction to random forests, see, for example, Hastie et al. (2009).
9See Appendix B.1 for details.
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τ̂(x) =
∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)∑
{i:Di=1} αi(x)
Yi −
∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)∑
{i:Di=0} αi(x)
Yi, (2.2)
where αi(x) is a type of similarity weight, measuring individual i’s relevance in the esti-
mation of τ(x). Thus, the causal forest estimator estimates τ(x) by taking the difference
in weighted average outcomes between the treated and untreated individuals.
To determine the weights αi(x), the causal forest algorithm uses an approach that is
based on the random forest method. The goal of Breiman’s (2001) original random
forest is to predict an outcome Yi using covariates Xi by averaging over predictions
from an ensemble of trees. Each tree is constructed by recursively splitting the covariate
space into axis-aligned partitions, whereby at every step the split is chosen to maximize
the tree’s prediction accuracy. The prediction accuracy is typically evaluated using the
mean squared error. After a stopping criterion has been reached, a single tree thus yields
a partitioning of the covariate space into disjoint regions, or leaves, and its prediction
for Yi at point Xi = x is calculated as the average Yi over all observations that fall into
the same leaf, based on their values in Xi, as the point x. For the construction of each
tree, a different bootstrap sample of the data is used, and at every step only a random
subset of all covariates is made available for splitting. Appendix B.2 shows an example
of a single tree.
Now, for obtaining the weights αi(x), the causal forest also grows an ensemble of trees
using recursive partitioning. However, rather than averaging over predictions from the
trees, the causal forest counts how many times individual i is in the same leaf as point x
across all constructed trees, and derives αi(x) based on this number. Specifically, for a
set of trees b = 1, . . . , B, the weight αi(x) for individual i is computed as follows:
αi(x) =
1
B
B∑
b=1
1{i ∈ Ib(x)}
nb(x)
, (2.3)
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where Ib(x) is the set of all indices for the individuals that are in the same leaf as point
x in tree b, and nb(x) is the number of individuals that fall into the same leaf as x in
tree b. Thus, the more often individual i is in the same leaf as point x, the more weight
i receives in estimating τ(x).
Compared with the random forest algorithm described above, the causal forest also uses
a different splitting criterion for constructing the trees. The causal forest criterion is
based on treatment effect estimates within the covariate space partitions, and, at a high
level, implies that the algorithm seeks to maximize the treatment effect heterogeneity
across partitions at every tree-splitting step. Athey et al. (2019) show that maximizing
this criterion is related to improving the tree’s expected accuracy in predicting treatment
effects (rather than the outcome Yi) at every step of the splitting procedure.
The causal forest also only allows splitting at every step based on a random subset of the
covariates. In addition, the algorithm grows its trees on random subsamples of the data
and implements a subsample splitting technique Athey et al. (2019) call honesty.10 The
idea behind the honest approach is to split a given subsample randomly into two roughly
equally sized parts. The tree structure is subsequently grown on one of the two subsam-
ple parts, and the resulting structure is used to determine which individuals in the other
subsample part are in the relevant neighborhood for estimating τ(x). Intuitively, the
approach implies that observation i’s outcome Yi is not able to influence the construc-
tion of its weight αi(x). This guards against spuriously extreme Yi values obtaining
unduly large influence in the data-driven weight calculation and thereby confounding
the estimate for τ(x).
Athey et al. (2019) show that the causal forest estimates are consistent and asymptoti-
cally normally distributed, and derive bootstrap standard errors that allow for construct-
ing valid confidence intervals.
We conduct our analysis in R, using the package grf by Tibshirani et al. (2018). The
package implements the causal forest estimator in the function causal forest, and also
includes the bootstrap standard errors.11 We estimate three causal forests, i.e., one for
10See Athey and Imbens (2016) and Wager and Athey (2018) for discussions of honesty.
11The function optimizes an approximation of the theoretically motivated tree-splitting criterion to
increase computational efficiency. See Athey et al. (2019) for details.
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each of our three outcomes. We grow each forest using 10,000 trees with at least two
observations per leaf. Following the function’s default values, we build each tree on a
50 percent subsample of our analysis sample, using the honest approach, and allow 27
of our 37 covariates as tree-splitting candidates at each step.12
2.4 Results
Section 2.4.1 describes the OLS average effect estimates for the full sample. Section
2.4.2 subsequently presents the results of our heterogeneity analysis, and Section 2.4.3
gives the estimates for our subgroup analysis based on the insights from the heterogene-
ity analysis, using our main analysis sample and an additional, independent, sample by
Carvalho et al. (2016).
2.4.1 OLS Analysis
Table 2.3 displays the OLS estimates for the average effect of the financial circum-
stances before payday on the main outcome – i.e., the number of correct answers per
second – and the two additional outcomes: number of correct answers and total re-
sponse time. As can be seen in Column (1), the estimated effect on the number of cor-
rect answers per second is statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level, and the point
estimate’s magnitude of 0.007 appears small relative to the average number of correct
answers per second for the after-payday group, which is 0.443. In addition, the sign of
the effect point estimate goes in the direction opposite to that which one would expect if
the poorer financial circumstances before payday were to impede cognitive function: on
average, the individuals assigned to the before-payday group gave a greater number of
correct answers per second than did the individuals assigned to the after-payday group.
Similar to the results in Column (1), the estimations for the other two outcomes, shown
in Columns (2) and (3), also yield effect estimates that are insignificant at the 10 percent
level, small in magnitude, and whose signs go in the direction opposite to that which is
12Because we use the honest approach in our estimation, effectively a 25 percent subsample is used
for growing each tree. For the other parameters that need to be specified in the causal forest function, we
also use the function’s default values, and we enable the local centering feature of the algorithm.
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expected.
In short, the estimates in Table 2.3 do not suggest that, on average, the poorer financial
circumstances before payday have a detrimental effect on cognition in the full sample.
This finding is in line with Carvalho et al.’s (2016) results.13
Table 2.3. OLS Average Effect Estimates
Outcome
Correct answers Number of Total response
per second correct answers time (in seconds)
(1) (2) (3)
Before payday 0.007 0.183 −1.062
(0.006) (0.425) (0.916)
Constant 0.443∗∗∗ 42.805∗∗∗ 101.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.305) (0.643)
Notes: N = 2, 480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table 2.1.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
13Table B.3 in the appendix additionally shows our effect estimates for the subgroups analyzed by
Carvalho et al. (2016). Also in line with their results, our estimations yield effect estimates that are
insignificant at the 10 percent level and small in magnitude for all subgroups.
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2.4.2 Heterogeneity Analysis
Our heterogeneity analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we calculate a variable impor-
tance measure for our three causal forests to identify which of the 37 covariates may be
especially important for heterogeneity in our effects of interest. Next, based on these
insights, we investigate in heatmaps how the conditional average treatment effects vary
over the two most important variables. Subsequently, we estimate effects for two ‘typ-
ical’ individuals in two regions in which the heatmaps suggest particularly detrimental
effects, and study how the effect estimates change when we vary the values of the 35
remaining covariates.
To assess variable importance in our estimated causal forests, we use a measure imple-
mented in the grf R package. For variable Xk, the variable importance measure essen-
tially captures the relative frequency with which a forest split on Xk across all grown
trees. The measure, therefore, gives an indication over which variables the conditional
average treatment effect may vary the most. For Xk, the measure ranges from 0, if the
forest never split on Xk, to 100, if the forest always split on Xk.14 Panel A in Figure
2.1 shows the variable importance plot for the causal forest using the number of correct
answers per second as the outcome. The panel yields that by far the two most important
variables in the tree-splitting procedure are the covariates age and current income. Both
have a variable importance value of approximately 25. All other covariates have a value
of around five at most. Similarly, for the two causal forests using the outcomes number
of correct answers and total response time, Panels B and C in Figure 2.1 also suggest
that age and current income are by far the most important variables.
14See Appendix B.3 for details.
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Figure 2.1. Variable Importance Plots for the Causal Forests
Panel A. Correct Answers per Second
Notes: N=2,480. The figure continues on the next page.
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Next, to explore how the effects vary in age and current income, Figure 2.2 displays
heatmaps, plotting effect estimates over an age–current income grid. The maximum
value on the x-axis of $1500 corresponds to the median current income in our sample.
For estimating the effects, we set all other continuous and categorical covariates to their
full sample median, and all dummy covariates according to the most frequently occur-
ring characteristics in the full sample. For example, 76.1 percent of all individuals in
the sample are white. Therefore, we set the dummy white equal to one, and all other
race dummies to zero.15 Red regions indicate effect estimates that are detrimental and
blue regions indicate effect estimates that are not detrimental.
Panel A in Figure 2.2 displays the estimated effects for the number of correct answers
per second. The panel shows that the causal forest estimates negative effects especially
for individuals who have a current income below approximately $750 and whose age
is either up to approximately 30 years or between around 70 and 80 years. A current
income of $750 appears rather low, corresponding to the 0.16 quantile of our sample’s
Figure 2.2. Causal Forest Effect Estimates over an Age–Current Income Grid
Panel A. Correct Answers per Second
Notes: N=2,480. The figure continues on the next page.
15See Appendix B.4 for further details.
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Figure 2.2 Continued
Panel B. Number of Correct Answers
Panel C. Total Response Time
Notes: N=2,480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). For the definitions of the outcome
variables, see Table 2.1. The heatmaps show conditional average treatment effect estimates obtained using the causal forest method.
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current income distribution. For the younger individuals with a lower current income,
the estimated effects are mostly in the range -0.02 to -0.045. The latter value corre-
sponds to approximately 31 percent of the outcome’s standard deviation and suggests
that the financial circumstances before payday led to 0.045 fewer correct answers per
second in the Stroop task. For the older individuals with a lower current income, the
effect estimates are between -0.01 and -0.02. Similar to Panel A, Panel B shows that
the causal forest using the number of correct answers as the outcome also estimates
particularly detrimental effects for individuals with a current income of at most around
$750, and who are either younger or older. For the older individuals, the especially
detrimental effect estimates are again concentrated in the approximate age range 70
to 80 years. However, they now actually also exceed the $750 threshold. The most
detrimental effect estimate in the Panel B heatmap equals -1.47, which corresponds to
approximately 14 percent of the standard deviation of the outcome. Panel C displays
the estimated effects for the outcome total response time. Similar to the other two pan-
els, the heatmap also yields detrimental effects for individuals whose current income is
below $750, and among the lower current income individuals, the causal forest again es-
timates particularly detrimental effects for younger individuals (up to around 27 years)
and older individuals (approximately above age 67). The estimated effects in the most
detrimental category are located at the ages 78 to 82 years for current income levels of
up to $425, and then at the ages between around 70 and 83 years for current income
between approximately $425 and $750. In this category, the causal forest gives effect
estimates on the total response time of up to 4.18 seconds, or 18 percent of the out-
come’s standard deviation. Thus, the heatmaps in Figure 2.2 suggest that the poorer
financial circumstances before payday impede, in particular, the cognition of younger
and older individuals with a lower current income. The negative effect on the number of
correct answers per second appears to result not only from fewer correct answers given
but also a slower total response time.
To gain a deeper understanding of the detrimental effects of the financial circumstances
before payday, we next zoom in on two regions in which the heatmaps indicate partic-
ularly harmful effects. Specifically, we estimate effects for a typical younger individ-
ual aged 20 and a typical older individual aged 75, who both have a current income
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of $450. We refer to these individuals as typical because we set all other 35 covari-
ates for estimating the effects according to the characteristics in a neighborhood of a
given age-current income combination: that is, we construct a five-year age and $250
current-income window centered at the respective age–current income combination and
determine the covariate values within this window using the same procedure as for cre-
ating the heatmaps above.16 The first row in the panels of Figures 2.3 and 2.4 gives the
estimates for the two typical individuals and all three outcomes. We call these estimates
the typical individual baseline estimates. To study how changing the other 35 covari-
ates affects the effect estimates, the panels then show, in the rows below the first row,
estimates for which we change one characteristic of a given typical individual at a time,
leaving all other variables constant. The empty rows indicate how the covariates are set
for a typical individual. For example, for the younger individual in Figure 2.3, the row
labeled ‘Male = 0’ is empty. This indicates that the younger typical individual is female.
The row labeled ‘Male = 1’ then shows the effect estimate when we change the typical
individual’s gender from female to male. Similarly, the row labeled ‘Unemployed =
1’ gives the effect estimate when we change the individual’s employment status from
working to unemployed (every time leaving all other covariates unchanged). In both
figures, the horizontal bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals.
The first row of Panel A in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 shows that the causal forest estimates a
negative effect of the financial circumstances before payday on the number of correct
answers per second for the younger and older typical individuals. For the younger
individual, the estimated effect is -0.0477, and significant at the 1 percent level. The
effect size corresponds to approximately one third of the outcome’s standard deviation.
For the older individual, the effect estimate is -0.0370, or approximately 26 percent
of the standard deviation of the outcome. The estimate is significant at the 5 percent
level.17
In line with the findings from the heatmaps, row one in Panels B and C in Figures 2.3
and 2.4 suggests that the detrimental effect on the main outcome results from the finan-
cial circumstances before payday having a detrimental effect on both its numerator and
denominator. The estimate for the effect on the number of correct answers is negative,
16See Appendix B.4 for further details.
17Tables B.4 and B.5 in the appendix display the estimates discussed in the text.
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Figure 2.3. Causal Forest Effect Estimates for the Typical Younger Individual
Age = 20, current income = $450
Notes: N=2,480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). The plots show conditional average
treatment effect estimates obtained using the causal forest method. The horizontal bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. For
the covariates household size and share payday pay amount, the plots give effect estimates at selected points. For the definitions of
the outcome variables, see Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.4. Causal Forest Effect Estimates for the Typical Older Individual
Age = 75, current income = $450
Notes: N=2,480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). The plots show conditional average
treatment effect estimates obtained using the causal forest method. The horizontal bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. For
the covariates household size and share payday pay amount, the plots give effect estimates at selected points. For the definitions of
the outcome variables, see Table 2.1.
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and the estimate for the effect on the total response time is positive. However, only
the response-time effect estimate for the older individual is significant at conventional
levels.
The rows below the first row in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that changing a single char-
acteristic of the two typical individuals does not yield estimates that differ much com-
pared with the baseline estimates. The sign of the effect estimates never changes, and
the magnitude of the point estimates remains similar.18 This behavior is in line with the
conclusion from the variable importance plots that age and current income are by far the
most important variables for effect heterogeneity.
2.4.3 Subgroup Analysis
Overall, our heterogeneity analysis suggests that poorer financial circumstances before
payday are especially detrimental for individuals who have a current income below ap-
proximately $750 and whose age is either roughly below 30 or above 70 years. Based
on this insight, we next estimate average treatment effects for this subgroup of interest
in our sample. Subsequently, to verify the findings in our main analysis sample, we
estimate average treatment effects for the subgroup of interest in an independent exper-
iment that Carvalho et al. (2016) conducted in their second online panel. Based on this
additional experiment, we only perform a traditional OLS subgroup analysis. We do
not use the additional experiment in our heterogeneity analysis using the causal forest
method.
To estimate average effects in our main analysis sample, we use the augmented inverse
propensity weighted estimator (Robins and Rotnitzky 1995) implemented in the grf R
package. The estimator uses the causal forest estimates for all individuals in the sub-
group of interest to form the average effect estimates. Table 2.4 presents the estimation
results for the subgroup analysis. Column (1) shows the estimate for the effect of the
financial circumstances before payday on the number of correct answers per second.
The estimation yields an effect estimate of -0.098, which corresponds to approximately
69 percent of the standard deviation of the outcome. The estimate is significant at the 1
18Appendix B.5 shows that the conclusions based on other typical individuals in the vicinity of the
two typical individuals discussed in the text are the same.
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percent level. Columns (2) and (3) display the results from the estimations that use the
numerator and denominator of our main outcome as dependent variables. Both regres-
sions also give harmful effect estimates, which are significant at least at the 5 percent
level. Thus, in line with the findings from our heterogeneity analysis, the estimations
yield detrimental effects on cognition of the poorer financial circumstances before pay-
day for our subgroup of interest.
Table 2.4. Subgroup Average Effect Estimates
Outcome
Correct answers Number of Total response
per second correct answers time (in seconds)
(1) (2) (3)
Before payday −0.098∗∗∗ −3.660∗∗ 11.823∗∗∗
(0.023) (1.539) (2.890)
Notes: N=117. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). Standard errors are in parentheses.
The sample includes all individuals who have a current income below $750 and whose age is either below 30 or above 70 years.
The estimates are obtained via an augmented inverse propensity weighted estimator which is based on the causal forest estimates
for the individuals in the sample. For variable definitions, see Table 2.1.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
To verify the validity of this finding, we next estimate treatment effects for our subgroup
of interest in the Flanker task experiment of Carvalho et al. (2016). The authors con-
ducted this experiment in the second online panel that they used, the RAND American
Life Panel. As the Stroop task studied in our main analysis, the Flanker task measures
cognitive control, and its goal is also to give correct answers to a repeated stimulus
as quickly as possible. Carvalho et al. (2016) ran the experiment with 20 trials per
participant.
Panel A in Table 2.5 replicates Carvalho et al.’s (2016) OLS estimates for the Flanker
task. The regressions do not suggest that the poorer financial circumstances before
payday have an effect on cognition in the full sample. The estimated effect on the
probability of giving a correct answer in a trial, in Column (1), and on the (log) time that
an individual took to respond to a trial, in Column (2), is close to zero and insignificant
at the 10 percent level. Panel B displays the analogous estimates for our subgroup of
interest. While the estimate in Column (1) does not suggest there to be an effect on the
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probability of giving a correct answer, the estimate in Column (2) does indeed suggest
a detrimental effect on the log response time per trial. The latter estimate is 0.274
and significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that the individuals responded on
average approximately 27 percent more slowly to the trials of the Flanker task due to the
poorer financial circumstances before payday. Thus, in line with the results of our main
analysis based on the KnowledgePanel, the analysis based on the American Life Panel
also yields detrimental cognitive effects of the poorer financial circumstances before
payday for younger and older individuals who have a lower income around the time of
the experiment.
Table 2.5. Subgroup Average Effect Estimates in an Independent Experiment
Outcome
Log response
Correct answer time per trial
(1) (2)
Panel A. Full sample
Before payday 0.007 0.016
(0.010) (0.028)
Constant 0.863∗∗∗ 8.060∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.030)
N 20,557 20,557
Individuals 1,076 1,076
Panel B. Subgroup: Current income below $750 and age below 30 or above 70 years
Before payday 0.045 0.274∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.099)
Constant 0.845∗∗∗ 7.908∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.107)
N 1,590 1,590
Individuals 85 85
Notes: The data are from the Flanker task experiment in the RAND American Life Panel by Carvalho et al. (2016). The table reports
OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. The regressions include trial-specific dummies.
The outcome correct answer is a dummy that equals one if individual i answered a trial correctly. The outcome log response time
per trial measures the log time in milliseconds that individual i took to respond to a trial. Panel A replicates the results from Table
6 of Carvalho et al. (2016).
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine heterogeneity in the effect of financial circumstances on cog-
nition. Our analysis is based on data from an experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016),
which randomly assigned low-income individuals in the US to perform a cognitive test
before or after payday. To explore heterogeneity in the effect of poorer financial circum-
stances before payday, we use the causal forest method by Athey et al. (2019), which is
designed for studying heterogeneous treatment effects in experiments.
The results of our analysis suggest that financial circumstances have heterogeneous ef-
fects on cognition. While in our full sample the estimations do not suggest that the
poorer financial circumstances before payday affect cognition, we do find detrimental
effects for younger and older individuals who received a very low income around the
time of the experiment. Specifically, our findings suggest that cognitive test perfor-
mance was worse among those who received an income of less than $750 at the time of
the experiment and whose age was below 30 or above 70 years. We also find detrimental
cognitive effects for this group of individuals in an additional, independent, experiment
conducted by Carvalho et al. (2016), which we do not use in our heterogeneity analysis.
Among the 37 covariates included in our analysis, age and current income appear to be
by far the most important for effect heterogeneity. All of the other covariates, such as
marital status, household size and education, do not appear to play an important role.
We derive a number of policy recommendations from our findings: First, to address the
potential negative cognitive effects of poor financial circumstances, it could be espe-
cially beneficial when designing poverty reduction measures to target these at individu-
als with very few current financial resources and who are either relatively young or old.
Second, for this group of individuals, it may prove helpful for public policy to take into
account a possible variation in cognitive capacity over payment cycles. For example,
to prevent potentially poor decision making due to limited cognition, public administra-
tion could try to avoid scheduling appointments with the affected individuals at the end
of their payment cycles. Because the payment cycles of welfare programs, such as the
food stamp program, are generally regular and set far in advance, this appears to be a
feasible option, especially in cases where individuals receive welfare payments.
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A fruitful avenue for further research might be to explore why the financial circum-
stances before payday had detrimental effects for some, but not all, individuals in the
experiment. A low current income, for example, may capture particularly poor financial
circumstances before payday, and younger and older individuals may be especially wor-
ried about these. To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms at play, it would
be helpful to obtain a larger experimental data set, which focuses on our identified sub-
group of affected individuals and would allow for a more detailed analysis.
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Appendix B
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B.1 Derivation of the Causal Forest Estimator
The causal forest estimator τ̂(x) for τ(x) in the random effects model posited in Section
2.3 is based on the two local moment equations
E (Yi − τ(x)Di − c(x)|Xi = x) = 0 (2.4)
E ((Yi − τ(x)Di − c(x))Di|Xi = x) = 0, (2.5)
where c(x) = E(εi|Xi = x) is an intercept term. All other quantities are defined as in
the main text. The estimator τ̂(x) is now obtained by minimizing an empirical version
of the two local moment equations:
(τ̂(x), ĉ(x)) = argminτ(x),c(x)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
αi(x)
 Yi − τ(x)Di − c(x)
(Yi − τ(x)Di − c(x))Di)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (2.6)
The resulting causal forest estimator can be written as
τ̂(x) =
∑n
i=1 αi(x)(Yi − Ȳα)(Di − D̄α)∑n
i=1 αi(x)(Di − D̄α)2
, (2.7)
where Ȳα =
∑n
i=1 αi(x)Yi, D̄α =
∑n
i=1 αi(x)Di, and αi(x) are the similarity weights.
It holds that
∑n
i=1 αi(x) = 1.
Equation (2.7) is the expression for the causal forest estimator in Section 6 of Athey et
al. (2019). To obtain the formulation of the estimator in Equation (2.2) in the main text,
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rewrite Equation (2.7) as follows. For the numerator, we have
n∑
i=1
αi(x)(Yi − Ȳα)(Di − D̄α)
=
n∑
i=1
αi(x)YiDi −
(
n∑
i=1
αi(x)Di
)(
n∑
i=1
αi(x)Yi
)
=
∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)Yi −
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)Yi +
∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)Yi

=
1− ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)Yi −
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)
 ∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)Yi
=
 ∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)Yi −
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)
 ∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)Yi (2.8)
For the denominator, we have
n∑
i=1
αi(x)(Di − D̄α)2 =
n∑
i=1
αi(x)Di −
(
n∑
i=1
αi(x)Di
)2
=
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)
1− ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)

=
 ∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)
 ∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)
 (2.9)
The derivations for the numerator and denominator exploit
∑n
i=1 αi(x) = 1 and D
2
i =
Di. Plugging expression (2.8) for the numerator and expression (2.9) for the denomina-
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tor into τ̂(x) from (2.7) yields
τ̂(x) =
(∑
{i:Di=0} αi(x)
)∑
{i:Di=1} αi(x)Yi −
(∑
{i:Di=1} αi(x)
)∑
{i:Di=0} αi(x)Yi(∑
{i:Di=1} αi(x)
)(∑
{i:Di=0} αi(x)
)
=
∑
{i:Di=1}
αi(x)∑
{i:Di=1} αi(x)
Yi −
∑
{i:Di=0}
αi(x)∑
{i:Di=0} αi(x)
Yi, (2.10)
which is the expression for the causal forest estimator in the main text.
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B.2 Tree Example
The figure below this paragraph shows an example of a single small (regression) tree.
The tree is built on a sample of size n = 50. The data used to construct the tree includes
the continuous covariates X1, X2 and the continuous outcome Y . In the first step,
starting from the top of the figure, the tree splits the full sample into two partitions based
on the variable X1. All observations with an X1 < 8.6 are put into the ‘left’ partition
and all observations with an X1 ≥ 8.6 are put into the ‘right’ partition. Analogously,
the tree subsequently splits the resulting ‘left’ partition on variable X2 and the resulting
‘right’ partition on variable X1 again. The splitting procedure yields four leaves, which
are shown at the bottom of the figure. For each leaf, the tree calculates the average
outcome Y by averaging over all Y values of all observations that fall into the respective
leaf. The averages are then used for predicting Y. For example, for an observation with
X1 < 8.6 and X2 ≥ 3.5, the tree predicts an outcome value of 10.
Regression Tree Example
Notes: The values in the boxes correspond to the average outcome Y over all observations that fall into a respective leaf. The
number of observations within each leaf is denoted by n.
B.3 Calculation of the Variable Importance Measure
The variable importance measure that we use in our causal forest analysis is imple-
mented in the function variable importance in the R package grf. We multiply the mea-
sure by 100 for readability. The function requires to set the maximum tree depth up to
which the measure considers splits, and a decay exponent that controls how the weight
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that the splits receive in the overall measure changes as the tree depth increases.19 We
use the default values of the variable importance function for the two parameters: we
set the maximum tree depth to four and the decay exponent to two. For variable Xk, the
measure is calculated as follows:
vi(Xk) =
(
4∑
j=1
wj
njk
nj
)
× 100, (2.11)
where njk is the number of times that all of the trees of the causal forest together split
on variable Xk at tree depth j, j = 1, . . . , 4. nj is the number of times that the trees
split at depth j, and wj = j
−2∑4
l=1 l
−2 is a tree depth-specific weight that determines the
importance of splits at a given depth.
In short, the variable importance measure vi(Xk) is a weighted sum of the relative
splitting frequencies for Xk over the depths j = 1, . . . , 4, where the weight of the
relative splitting frequencies decreases as the tree depth increases.
B.4 Procedure to Set the Covariates
For creating the heatmaps in Figure 2.2, we set the covariates household size and share
of payday pay amount relative to current income to their median values in the full sam-
ple. All other covariates, which are dummies, we set according to the most frequently
occurring characteristics in the full sample. To give two more examples in addition
to the example in Section 2.4.2, Table 2.2 shows that the most frequent marital status
category is married, with 33.5 percent. Thus, we set the dummy married equal to one
and all other marital status dummies we set to zero. Furthermore, Table 2.2 shows that
80.4 percent of individuals live in a metropolitan area. Accordingly, we set the dummy
metropolitan area equal to one.
To obtain the estimates for the typical individuals in Tables B.4 and B.5 and the first
19For a given tree, the split at depth one corresponds to the first split that a tree places, starting from
the entire subsample, and splitting it into two partitions. The splits at depth two then correspond to the
splits that the tree performs starting from the two partitions created at depth 1. The next depths follow
analogously.
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row of Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we proceed analogously to the covariate setting procedure
for the heatmaps. However, rather than setting the variables according to the full sample
characteristics, we determine the covariate values according to the characteristics in a
five-year age and $250 current-income window which is centered at the age–current
income combination for which we want to estimate an effect. For example, for the
typical older individual in Figure 2.4, the relevant window for setting the covariates
ranges from 73 to 77 years of age and from $325.5 to $574.5 of current income. If
there are tied categories in categorical variables or dummies that relate to an ordinal
characteristic, such as annual household income or education, we select the lowest tied
category.20 For example, if there are equally many individuals in a respective age–
current income window with a high school degree and some college, we set the dummy
high school to one and all other education dummies to zero. If there are tied categories
in non-ordinal characteristics, such as martial status or being liquidity constrained, we
set the covariates by extending the age–current income window by one year and $100
in each direction, i.e., we use a seven-year age and $450 current-income window.21
B.5 Estimates in the Vicinity of the Two Typical Indi-
viduals
In our main analysis, we estimate effects for two typical individuals who have a cur-
rent income of $450 and whose age is 20 and 75 years, respectively. To assert that the
insights based on the two typical individuals are not sensitive to the specific choice of
the age–current income combination, we additionally estimate effects for other typical
individuals that are in the vicinity of our two typical individuals from the main analysis,
where the heatmaps also indicate pronounced detrimental effects. Specifically, we in-
crease and decrease, respectively, age by one and two years and current income by $25
and $50 relative to the typical individuals from the heterogeneity analysis. We estimate
20Similarly, if the median household size, as calculated by R, is a non-integer value, we set the house-
hold size to the largest integer below the respective median household size. For example, a median
household size of 3.5, we set to 3.
21For the typical individual with age 20 and current income equal to $400 in Table B.4, extending the
age–current income window does not break the tie in the variable household head. In this case, we set
household head equal to zero. Setting household head equal to one instead yields the same conclusions.
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the effects analogously to the typical individual baseline estimates in Figure 2.3 and
Figure 2.4. Tables B.4 and B.5 present the estimates for the other typical younger and
older individuals. In the interest of space, we do not display the effect estimates when
varying the other 35 covariates. However, very similar to the findings in our main anal-
ysis, varying the other covariates one by one does also not change the estimates much
relative to the baseline estimates.
The comparison between the estimates for the two typical individuals from our main
analysis, which are displayed in the gray shaded areas of Table B.4 and Table B.5, and
the other typical individuals shows that overall the vicinity estimates are quite similar
to the estimates from the main analysis. For our main outcome, correct answers per
second, Panel A in both tables shows that the estimates for the other typical individuals
are also always negative and of a similar magnitude as for the respective younger or
older typical individual from the main analysis. For the typical younger individuals, all
estimates, except for one, are significant at conventional levels. For the typical older
individuals, the estimates sometimes lose significance at the 10 percent level.
Panel B in Table B.4 and Table B.5 shows that the estimates for the outcome number of
correct answers are also always negative and the point estimates appear quite similar to
the respective estimate for the main analysis typical individual, considering the magni-
tude of the standard errors. As in the main analysis, the estimates are insignificant at the
10 percent level in most regressions. Similar to the findings in Panel B, the estimates for
the other typical individuals using the outcome total response time in Panel C are also
not substantially different from the respective estimate for the typical individual in the
main analysis. In all regressions, the estimations yield positive effect estimates that are
insignificant at the 10 percent level for the younger individuals, and mostly significant
at conventional levels for the older individuals.
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B.6 Additional Tables
Table B.1. Variation in Financial Resources at Payday
Outcome
Checking Total
Cash and savings expenditures
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. OLS regressions
Before payday −33.39 −6032.75 −542.88
(73.72) (5083.40) (378.69)
Constant 273.18∗∗∗ 15520.66∗∗∗ 1279.50∗∗∗
(55.52) (5000.96) (371.45)
Panel B. Median regressions
Before payday −5.00 −500.00∗∗∗ −200.00∗∗∗
(4.26) (122.05) (33.03)
Constant 50.00∗∗∗ 1500.00∗∗∗ 600.00∗∗∗
(2.19) (109.85) (26.08)
Panel C. p-values for Wilcoxon tests of equality of distributions
0.01 0.00 0.00
N 2,295 2,127 2,296
Notes: The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). For the OLS regressions, heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. For the median regressions, bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 replications are in
parentheses. Compared with the analogous results in Carvalho et al.’s (2016) Table 1, only the before-payday estimate in the OLS
regression using the outcome total expenditures and the before-payday estimate in the median regression using the outcome cash
loses significance in our sample, which is smaller. The two estimates are significant at the 10 percent level in Carvalho et al.’s
(2016) analysis.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.2. Balance Checks
Mean
After payday Before payday p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Age 56.062 55.836 0.747
Male 0.328 0.340 0.515
Household size 1.935 1.953 0.705
Household head 0.843 0.849 0.706
Children in household 0.162 0.173 0.463
Metropolitan area 0.810 0.799 0.499
Current income 1735.856 1740.043 0.937
Share of payday pay amount
relative to current income
0.758 0.765 0.534
Financial strain
Live from paycheck to paycheck 0.480 0.498 0.388
Caloric crunch 0.473 0.467 0.758
Liquidity constrained 0.500 0.506 0.752
Financial hardship 0.404 0.423 0.332
Marital status
Married 0.323 0.346 0.213
Divorced 0.277 0.275 0.924
Widowed 0.138 0.140 0.867
Never married 0.263 0.239 0.164
Race
White 0.756 0.766 0.556
Black 0.110 0.090 0.089∗
Hispanic 0.084 0.080 0.736
Other race 0.050 0.064 0.130
Notes: The table continues on the next page.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.2. Continued
Mean
After payday Before payday p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Employment status
Working 0.284 0.290 0.744
Unemployed 0.067 0.060 0.521
Disabled 0.191 0.207 0.333
Retired 0.391 0.385 0.771
Other employment status 0.067 0.058 0.330
Education
Less than high school 0.062 0.064 0.855
High school 0.247 0.260 0.465
Some college 0.419 0.415 0.860
College 0.272 0.261 0.534
Annual household income
Less than $5,000 0.048 0.048 0.990
Between $5,000 and $10,000 0.094 0.105 0.362
Between $10,000 and $15,000 0.134 0.152 0.193
Between $15,000 and $20,000 0.131 0.109 0.081∗
Between $20,000 and $25,000 0.147 0.151 0.802
Between $25,000 and $30,000 0.144 0.143 0.941
Between $30,000 and $35,000 0.143 0.138 0.721
Between $35,000 and $40,000 0.158 0.155 0.787
Notes: N = 2, 480. The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). Columns (1) and (2) show the
covariate means for the individuals who are randomly assigned to be surveyed after payday or before payday. Column (3) gives the
p-values from pairwise t-tests which test whether the difference in means between the before-payday group and after-payday group
for a given covariate is different from zero. The difference in means for the covariate black is also significant at the 10 percent level
in Carvalho et al.’s (2016) full sample. The p-value of an F -test which tests whether all of the variables jointly predict assignment
into the before-payday group is 0.879.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.3. OLS Average Effect Estimates for the Subgroups Analyzed by Carvalho et
al. (2016)
Outcome Number of correct Number of Total responseanswers per second correct answers time (in seconds)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Subgroup: One payment
Before payday 0.003 −0.014 −1.500
(0.008) (0.663) (1.332)
Constant 0.419∗∗∗ 41.799∗∗∗ 104.461∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.478) (0.986)
N 1,265 1,265 1,265
Panel B. Subgroup: Financial hardship
Before payday 0.007 0.066 −0.949
(0.009) (0.670) (1.474)
Constant 0.447∗∗∗ 42.638∗∗∗ 99.784∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.490) (1.050)
N 1,026 1,026 1,026
Panel C. Subgroup: Live paycheck to paycheck
Before payday 0.012 0.435 −1.737
(0.008) (0.602) (1.284)
Constant 0.441∗∗∗ 42.629∗∗∗ 100.863∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.450) (0.933)
N 1,213 1,213 1,213
Panel D. Subgroup: Annual household income less than $20,000
Before payday 0.000 −0.376 −0.321
(0.009) (0.756) (1.522)
Constant 0.424∗∗∗ 41.686∗∗∗ 102.278∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.534) (1.045)
N 1,020 1,020 1,020
Panel E. Subgroup: Caloric crunch
Before payday 0.011 0.666 −1.190
(0.009) (0.645) (1.353)
Constant 0.433∗∗∗ 42.040∗∗∗ 101.913∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.482) (0.982)
N 1,165 1,165 1,165
Panel F. Subgroup: Liquidity constrained
Before payday 0.013 0.257 −1.753
(0.008) (0.619) (1.388)
Constant 0.437∗∗∗ 42.332∗∗∗ 101.796∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.449) (0.959)
N 1,248 1,248 1,248
Notes: The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are
in parentheses. For the definitions of the outcome variables and the regressor before payday, see Table 2.1.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.4. Causal Forest Estimates for Typical Individuals in the Vicinity of the Typical
Younger Individual
Age 18 19 20 21 22
Current income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Outcome: Correct answers per second
$400 −0.0520∗ −0.0388∗∗ −0.0385∗∗ −0.0434∗∗ −0.0420∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0172) (0.0187) (0.0198) (0.0166)
$425 −0.0545∗∗ −0.0451∗∗ −0.0499∗∗∗ −0.0418∗∗ −0.0386∗
(0.0224) (0.0183) (0.0167) (0.0198) (0.0211)
$450 −0.0545∗∗ −0.0525∗∗ −0.0477∗∗∗ −0.0415∗ −0.0387∗
(0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0145) (0.0225) (0.0207)
$475 −0.0620∗∗ −0.0369∗∗ −0.0405∗∗ −0.0380∗∗ −0.0377∗∗
(0.0252) (0.0160) (0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0182)
$500 −0.0396∗ −0.0296∗∗ −0.0424∗ −0.0396 −0.0350∗
(0.0236) (0.0140) (0.0220) (0.0284) (0.0212)
Panel B. Outcome: Number of correct answers
$400 −2.281 −1.569 −1.572 −1.566 −1.376
(1.848) (1.276) (1.282) (1.467) (1.430)
$425 −2.692∗ −2.014 −2.221∗ −1.398 −1.263
(1.488) (1.697) (1.233) (1.581) (1.103)
$450 −2.693∗ −2.419 −2.253 −1.256 −1.268
(1.475) (1.597) (1.844) (1.356) (1.073)
$475 −3.384∗ −1.379 −1.817 −1.143 −1.260
(2.009) (1.566) (1.503) (0.999) (1.182)
$500 −1.241 −0.739 −2.138∗ −1.546 −1.453
(1.273) (1.445) (1.252) (1.814) (1.282)
Panel C. Outcome: Total response time
$400 1.626 1.445 1.424 2.705 2.587∗
(2.758) (2.925) (2.883) (2.179) (1.466)
$425 2.286 1.068 1.984 3.255∗ 2.224
(1.962) (2.249) (1.730) (1.834) (1.874)
$450 2.293 2.062 1.559 2.342 2.232
(2.022) (2.327) (1.515) (2.366) (1.894)
$475 1.442 1.042 0.901 2.480 2.146
(2.881) (2.886) (1.628) (2.072) (1.833)
$500 1.572 1.118 0.759 0.657 1.197
(1.991) (2.483) (2.209) (1.810) (1.608)
Notes: The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). Standard errors are in parentheses. For the
definitions of the outcome variables, see Table 2.1. The table shows conditional average treatment effect estimates obtained using
the causal forest method. For more information, see Appendix B.5.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.5. Causal Forest Estimates for Typical Individuals in the Vicinity of the Typical
Older Individual
Age 73 74 75 76 77
Current income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Outcome: Correct answers per second
$400 −0.0340 −0.0356∗ −0.0361∗∗ −0.0359∗ −0.0247
(0.0226) (0.0193) (0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0205)
$425 −0.0359∗∗ −0.0364∗ −0.0370∗∗ −0.0367∗ −0.0253
(0.0160) (0.0199) (0.0188) (0.0200) (0.0186)
$450 −0.0359∗∗ −0.0365∗ −0.0370∗∗ −0.0367∗ −0.0253
(0.0156) (0.0197) (0.0187) (0.0200) (0.0184)
$475 −0.0366∗∗ −0.0373∗∗ −0.0378∗∗ −0.0376∗∗ −0.0256
(0.0142) (0.0176) (0.0167) (0.0183) (0.0175)
$500 −0.0369∗∗ −0.0376∗∗ −0.0381∗∗ −0.0379∗∗ −0.0369∗
(0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0182) (0.0197)
Panel B. Outcome: Number of correct answers
$400 −0.850 −1.204 −1.436 −1.529 −0.985
(1.258) (1.616) (1.791) (1.642) (1.585)
$425 −0.840 −1.209 −1.445 −1.543 −1.004
(1.693) (1.553) (1.753) (1.582) (1.550)
$450 −0.831 −1.206 −1.442 −1.540 −0.998
(1.671) (1.546) (1.742) (1.573) (1.546)
$475 −0.786 −1.212 −1.452 −1.551 −0.993
(1.410) (1.316) (1.555) (1.369) (1.299)
$500 −0.778 −1.203 −1.440 −1.537 −1.540
(1.420) (1.360) (1.601) (1.411) (1.537)
Panel C. Outcome: Total response time
$400 4.971 6.238∗∗ 6.195∗∗ 6.221∗∗ 3.822
(4.102) (2.828) (2.887) (2.895) (3.701)
$425 5.834∗ 6.375∗∗ 6.318∗∗ 6.350∗∗ 3.932
(3.266) (2.804) (2.874) (2.954) (3.893)
$450 5.856∗ 6.376∗∗ 6.319∗∗ 6.351∗∗ 3.928
(3.344) (2.817) (2.888) (2.981) (3.916)
$475 6.020∗ 6.517∗∗ 6.461∗∗ 6.488∗∗ 4.022
(3.538) (2.535) (2.695) (2.767) (3.704)
$500 6.200∗ 6.701∗∗ 6.646∗∗ 6.668∗∗ 6.372∗∗
(3.741) (3.209) (3.321) (3.234) (2.715)
Notes: The data are from the KnowledgePanel experiment by Carvalho et al. (2016). Standard errors are in parentheses. For the
definitions of the outcome variables, see Table 2.1. The table shows conditional average treatment effect estimates obtained using
the causal forest method. For more information, see Appendix B.5.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Chapter 3
A Natural Experiment on the Role of
Response Uncertainty in Household
Surveys
3.1 Introduction
For many years, large-scale household surveys have been one of the most important
sources of data for empirical research in economics and the social sciences more gen-
erally. For example, the questions of how consumption levels and patterns change after
retirement, whether such changes are expected or not, and how they are related to finan-
cial planning in pre-retirement years are of major importance in current debates about
public policy. The empirical analysis of these issues requires reliable data on house-
holds’ income, consumption expenditure, and many other variables. Typically, such
data are taken from household surveys.1
Even though large-scale household surveys have been a major success story for more
than three decades, concerns about the quality of data collected in social surveys are
growing, for instance because of increasing rates of nonresponse and potentially severe
1Important examples are the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), see Juster and Suzman (1995),
or its European counterpart, the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), see Börsch-
Supan et al. (2013b).
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measurement error (see, e.g., Meyer et al. 2015). At the same time, the research possi-
bilities afforded by administrative data, ‘big data’ and other sources of naturally occur-
ring data receive considerable attention (see Einav and Levin 2014; Varian 2014). Data
from such sources are increasingly viewed as superior alternatives to survey data, and
there is a debate about whether such data will replace those from households surveys.
However, as Groves (2011) emphasizes, the key feature shared by these data is that their
collection is not designed with research in mind, but they exist for other reasons and are
then ‘harvested’ for research purposes. To us, it therefore seems that despite their mer-
its, naturally occurring data cannot replace survey data. We rather believe that for the
foreseeable future, household surveys will continue to be an important source of data
for the social sciences. For this reason, we think that further improving response quality
in household surveys will be crucial, in particular as competing data sources become
available.
In this paper, we focus on a determinant of response quality in household surveys that
has received relatively little attention in the literature: the respondents’ uncertainty
about the quantities they are asked to report. We use data from a natural experiment
that allows us to test hypotheses about the relationship between survey respondents’
subjective uncertainty, their memory capacity, and data quality. The natural experiment
is provided by the fact that in the United States, Social Security checks used to be de-
livered on the third of each month.2 As interview dates in large household surveys
span over field periods of several weeks (and are as good as random in an econometric
sense), we argue that this leads to exogenous variation in the time passed since the last
Social Security check delivery, which can be considered a key determinant of response
uncertainty in Social Security income.
Our study is related to a small literature in economics that builds on insights from social
and cognitive psychology as well as survey research to construct models of survey re-
sponse error. These models recognize that survey respondents are often uncertain about
the quantities a researcher would like them to report. It is easy for respondents to answer
2Stephens (2003) uses the same natural experiment to investigate consumption smoothing. He finds
that some spending on some expenditure categories rises sharply on the days after the delivery of the
Social Security check, which indicates that people are unable to smooth consumption over short horizons.
Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) also use the timing of Social Security check delivery in a study of
consumption patterns.
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questions about their age, marital status, and family relations, but other quantities of in-
terest to economists, including consumption and income, are not easily recalled from
memory. It might also be impractical for respondents to look them up, for instance in
bank records, during a survey interview. Consequently, respondents use heuristics when
they construct their answers on the spot, and these heuristics might bias their responses.3
Several studies, such as the ones by Battistin et al. (2003), Battistin and Padula (2016),
and Angel et al. (2019) as well as those reviewed by Bound et al. (2001), Browning et
al. (2003), and Browning et al. (2014), document how recall biases lead to measure-
ment error in variables such as consumption and income constructed from survey data.
Hoderlein and Winter (2010) study how recall errors affect the estimation of economet-
ric models in a general, nonparametric framework.
An important conclusion from this literature is that recall errors should best be avoided
or at least mitigated, as they are statistically more complex than classical measurement
error and difficult to correct in econometric models. Existing insights from neighbor-
ing disciplines on the determinants of survey response behavior and of recall errors
more specifically have not yet been fully explored in the specific contexts of surveys
on economic quantities. One issue that has not received much attention, at least in the
literature on responses to household surveys that focus on economic variables, is the
direct role of subjective uncertainty about the quantities in question – this is the topic of
the present paper. The natural experiment described above overcomes a key challenge,
namely obtaining reliable measures of survey respondents’ subjective uncertainty about
the exact values of quantities such as income or expenditure items that are otherwise
hard to obtain.
As the natural experiment induces variation in respondent uncertainty, we can test the
following hypotheses. Uncertainty about the amount of the Social Security payment
should be the higher the longer ago the check was delivered. This effect should be more
pronounced for persons with limited memory capacity. In addition, we expect the effect
to be even more pronounced for those persons with a limited memory capacity who are
unaware of their poor mental ability, because their distorted perception of their mental
ability may lead them to putting less effort into recalling the answer to the question. We
3Tourangeau et al. (2000) provide an overview of the literature on survey response behavior and
question design in social psychology.
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operationalize these hypotheses by using the fraction of rounded responses as the main
dependent variable. Rounding has been shown to be related to subjective uncertainty
in a few studies, including Ruud et al. (2014). The fact that rounding is associated
with subjective uncertainty has also been exploited to construct measures of aggregate
macroeconomic uncertainty (see Binder 2017; Rossmann 2019).4
We use data from the second wave of the Health and Retirement Study, a national survey
of persons aged 50 and older that was fielded in 1994. This survey is special in that it
contains the exact interview date, which allows us to construct a measure of the time
passed since the social security check has been received. Moreover, this survey contains
measures of cognitive ability and memory capacity which allow us to test the additional
hypotheses stated above. Overall, our hypotheses that postulate a relationship between
the time span since the last income receipt, subjective uncertainty and response quality,
moderated by memory capacity, are supported by these data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the HRS
data and the natural experiment on response uncertainty. Section 3.3 reports the main
results. Section 3.4 presents results from robustness checks. Section 3.5 provides some
concluding remarks.
3.2 Natural Experiment and Data
3.2.1 Natural Experiment on Response Uncertainty in the HRS
To test the hypotheses outlined in the introduction, we use data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a bi-annual national panel study which surveys
Americans over the age of 50 (and their partner). The survey started with an initial
sample of about 12,700 individuals in 1992 and collects information about a wide range
of topics, such as household finances, cognition, and retirement decisions. For our
analysis, we use data from the HRS wave 1994. We use wave 1994 data because, in
4There is also a related literature that studies the properties of measurement error induced by rounding
and the implications for the estimation of econometric models (see Manski and Molinari 2010; Hoderlein
et al. 2015).
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addition to last month’s Social Security income and memory measures, the wave also
contains the exact interview date in the public use file, which is crucial for our analysis.
This makes wave 1994 well-suited for the investigation.5 Before explaining the idea of
the natural experiment in more detail, we describe the central survey questions for our
analysis and how we define the key variables.
The income question our analysis focuses on relates to the amount of the Social Security
check that an individual received last month. The question is asked of all individuals
who report receiving income from Social Security at the time of the interview and is
worded as follows: ‘How much did you receive from Social Security last month?’. To
investigate uncertainty in the answer to this question, we look at two types of uncer-
tainty measures. Our first response uncertainty measure is a dummy which equals one if
the Social Security amount for an individual is missing in the data.6 Reasons for miss-
ing check amount information include the answer ‘don’t know’, values that the survey
termed inappropriate, and refusal of the individual to provide the amount. The motiva-
tion for this measure is that if an individual is uncertain about his or her Social Security
check amount, one may expect that he or she becomes more likely to provide a response
to the check amount question that results in a missing. As our second type of uncer-
tainty measure, we construct dummies that indicate if an individual stated a rounded
check amount. Specifically, in our analysis we include three dummies that equal one
if an individual’s reported Social Security check amount is a multiple of 10, 50, and
100, respectively. The rounding measures relate to the observation that individuals tend
to report a rounded number when they are uncertain about an underlying quantity of
interest, as discussed in the introduction above.
For constructing our memory capacity measure, we use information from a memory
test called delayed word recall task. In wave 1994, the test proceeds as follows. The
5HRS wave 1992 and AHEAD wave 1993 also contain the exact interview date. However, HRS wave
1992 does not include information about the Social Security check amount last month and, unlike HRS
wave 1994, AHEAD wave 1993 does not include the date of the end of the interview; if a scheduled
interview was postponed, the end-of-the-interview date is usually the date on which the interview took
place and thus would be needed for our analysis. Additionally, the AHEAD 1993 wave’s word recall
task, which we use to construct our memory capacity variable, asks respondents to remember a different
number of words than the word recall task in HRS wave 1994.
6The HRS imputes Social Security check amounts for these individuals. We set their check amounts
to missing in our analysis, as this is a relevant outcome.
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interviewer reads out 20 nouns to the respondent (e.g., mountain, coffee, door). After
approximately five minutes during which other survey questions are asked, the respon-
dent then has to repeat as many of the 20 read out words as possible. Based on this task,
we consider an individual to have a bad memory if he or she remembers at most three
out of the 20 words, and to have a good memory if he or she recalls more than three
words.
Our measure indicating if an individual with a bad memory is unaware of his or her
bad mental ability we construct based on the question ‘First, how would you rate your
ability to think quickly at the present time? Would you say it is excellent, very good,
good, fair, or poor?’. Individuals answering the question with good, very good, or
excellent we define to be unaware of their bad mental ability, and individuals answering
the question with fair or poor, we consider to be aware of their bad mental ability.
During our sample period, Social Security checks are delivered on the third day of each
month.7 Combining this knowledge with an individual’s interview date, we construct
a variable which gives the number of days since the last Social Security check receipt
by calculating the difference between an individual’s interview date and the last Social
Security payday. Based on this variable, we define our regressor of interest below. Fig-
ure 3.1 displays the distribution of the days since the last Social Security check delivery
variable for our analysis sample. The figure shows that there is some cyclical variation
in the number of days since the last check arrival, because Social Security checks are
not delivered on weekends, and the longest time spans of 31 and 32 days occur less
frequently, because in most months the payment cycle is shorter. Nevertheless, the time
spans are overall quite evenly distributed over the entire range of possible values from
0 to 32. This supports the notion that the survey’s interview dates are quasi-randomly
distributed, leading also to a quasi-random assignment of the time since the last So-
cial Security check receipt. The latter observation gives rise to the following natural
experiment exploited in this paper.
7If the third of the month is a weekend day or holiday, Social Security checks are delivered on the
first day before the respective day that is neither a weekend day nor holiday. Our analysis takes this into
account. In our analysis sample, the interviews take place between 7 May 1994 and 21 December 1994.
We use the end-of-the-interview date.
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of the Days since the Last Social Security
Check Delivery
Notes: N = 1, 223. Authors’ calculations based on 1994 HRS data.
3.2.2 Econometric Approach
To test if survey respondents’ uncertainty in their reported Social Security check amount
increases in the time since their last Social Security check receipt, we compare Social
Security income recipients who are interviewed at a late stage of the Social Security
payment cycle with Social Security recipients who are interviewed at an early stage of
the Social Security payment cycle. The quasi-random assignment of the days since the
last Social Security check arrival in our sample implies that the individuals are quasi-
randomly interviewed at either the early or late stage of the payment cycle. To inves-
tigate how response uncertainty varies by memory capacity and unawareness of bad
mental ability, we additionally conduct this comparison for different sub-samples of our
analysis sample. Specifically, for individual i, we estimate versions of the following
OLS regression equation:
yi = α + βlatei + x
′
iγ + εi, (3.1)
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where yi is one of our described uncertainty measures, xi is a vector of covariates de-
scribed in the next section, latei is our regressor of interest, which equals one if an
individual is interviewed 15 to 32 days after his or her last Social Security check re-
ceipt, and zero otherwise, and εi is a zero-mean error term. Due to the quasi-random
assignment of the number of days since the last check arrival, latei is uncorrelated with
the error term.
3.2.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
For our analysis sample, we select all individuals in the HRS wave 1994 who report
receiving currently Social Security income and who do not have missing values in our
analysis variables. This selection procedure yields 1,223 individuals out of the 6,979
individuals reporting about Social Security income receipt.8
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the reported Social Security check amount
last month and the covariates we include in our regressions. The average age in our
sample is approximately 62 years, 58.8 percent of the individuals are male and almost
80 percent are white/Caucasian. Additionally, the majority of respondents is retired,
76.2 percent, and approximately two thirds of the individuals have at most a high school
degree. On average, the individuals with a non-missing Social Security check amount
report having received approximately $658 last month.
Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics and summarizes the definitions for our uncer-
tainty measures, regressor of interest, and the two grouping variables for the sub-sample
analyses. The table shows that 6.9 percent of individuals in our sample have a missing
check amount. This number appears relatively low and may suggest that the individuals
report a check amount even if they are uncertain about the exact figure. Conversely,
a relatively high fraction of individuals provide focal responses to the Social Security
check amount question: 34.8 percent of respondents who have a non-missing check
8Additionally, we drop four individuals with reported Social Security check amounts of $0 and two
individuals who report an implausibly large amount of $10,000 and above. In every HRS household, only
one individual called financial respondent answers the questions of the survey’s income section, which
contains our required Social Security income receipt and corresponding check amount question. Thus, all
individuals in our sample are financial respondents. We use the RAND HRS data files for our analysis.
The data files are carefully pre-processed versions of the raw HRS data, which facilitate the use of the
HRS data.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Covariates and Social Security Check Amount
Variable
Variable Mean Standard deviation N
Social Security amount (in Dollars) 657.549 262.706 1, 139
Male 0.588 0.492 1, 223
Age (in years) 62.048 5.066 1, 223
White/Caucasian 0.789 0.408 1, 223
Married 0.644 0.479 1, 223
Labor force status
Working 0.103 0.304 1, 223
Unemployed 0.029 0.167 1, 223
Retired 0.762 0.426 1, 223
Disabled 0.065 0.246 1, 223
Not in labor force 0.042 0.200 1, 223
Education
Less than high school 0.343 0.475 1, 223
GED 0.050 0.218 1, 223
High school 0.311 0.463 1, 223
Some College 0.161 0.368 1, 223
College and above 0.135 0.342 1, 223
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on 1994 HRS data.
amount state a figure which is a multiple of 10, 19.1 percent report multiples of 50, and
14.5 percent report multiples of 100. The shares suggest that indeed a non-negligible
number of respondents may be uncertain about their Social Security check amount last
month. Considering that the average Social Security check amount is about $658, round-
ing to multiples of 10 does not appear to indicate substantial uncertainty in the reported
figure and does likely not create substantial measurement error. Conversely, rounding
to multiples of 50 or even 100 seems to indicate significant uncertainty in the reported
amount and may lead to substantial measurement error for analyses using last month’s
Social Security income as a variable.
In addition, Table 3.2 gives that 52.8 percent of individuals are interviewed late in the
Social Security payment cycle. This share is intuitively plausible given the relatively
uniform distribution of the number of days since the last Social Security check arrival in
our sample and considering that the late variable splits the payment cycle approximately
into two equal parts. For our grouping variables, the table indicates that about a third of
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the individuals have a bad memory, and out of the 343 bad memory individuals who do
not have a missing Social Security check amount, 63.3 percent are unaware of their bad
mental ability.
Table 3.2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Uncertainty Measures,
Regressor of Interest, and Grouping Variables
Standard
Variable Definition Mean deviation N
Uncertainty Measures
Missing check amount = 1 if the Social Security amount is
missing
0.069 0.253 1, 223
10-focal response = 1 if the Social Security amount is
a multiple of 10
0.348 0.476 1, 139
50-focal response = 1 if the Social Security amount is
a multiple of 50
0.191 0.394 1, 139
100-focal response = 1 if the Social Security amount is
a multiple of 100
0.145 0.352 1, 139
Regressor of interest
Late = 1 if the interview takes place
15–32 days after the last Social
Security check delivery
0.528 0.499 1, 223
Grouping variables
Memory bad = 1 if the individual remembered
≤ 3 out of the 20 words in the
delayed word recall task
0.303 0.460 1, 223
Unaware of bad
mental ability
Among all individuals with a
non-missing Social Security
amount and bad memory:
= 1 if the individual rates his or her
ability to think quickly at the
present time as good, very good, or
excellent (as opposed to fair or
poor).
0.633 0.483 343
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on 1994 HRS data.
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3.3 Main Results
In this section, we present our main results, based on a series of regressions with the
missing check amount indicator and the three focal response indicators as the depen-
dent variables. We complement the regression tables with figures that highlight the key
contrasts graphically.
Table 3.3. Change in the Fraction of Missing Check Amounts between the Early and
Late Stage of the Social Security Payment Cycle
Sample All Memory good Memory bad
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Late 0.018 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.030 0.028
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant 0.059∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ −0.554 0.057∗∗∗ −0.684
(0.010) (0.249) (0.012) (0.370) (0.018) (0.538)
Controls – X – X – X
N 1, 223 853 370
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The estimations are based on 1994 HRS data. All models are
estimated via OLS. The outcome variable is the missing check amount measure defined in Table 3.2. The set of control variables
consists of the dummy variables male, white, married, working, unemployed, retired, disabled, GED, high school, some college,
college and above, and the continuous variables age, age2. The labor force status not in labor force and the education category less
than high school are omitted because of multicolinearity. All individuals for whom the dummy variable memory bad equals one
belong to the ‘memory bad sample’. All other individuals belong to the ‘memory good sample’. For the definition of the regressor
late, and memory bad variable, see Table 3.2.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.3 displays the estimation results for the missing check amount measure. The cor-
responding Figure 3.2 shows the coefficient estimates for the models without controls,
stratified by memory capacity, as shown in Columns (3) and (5) of Table 3.3. Columns
(1) and (2) show for the full sample that the fraction of missing check amounts is 1.8
percentage points higher for the individuals interviewed late in the Social Security pay-
ment cycle compared with the individuals interviewed early in the cycle. The estimate is
insignificant at the 10 percent level, with and without controls, however. Looking at the
estimates by memory capacity, Columns (3)–(6) yield that the increase in the fraction of
missing values between the early and late payment cycle stage is larger for the individ-
uals with a bad memory (approximately 2.8 percentage points) than for the individuals
93
CHAPTER 3. RESPONSE UNCERTAINTY IN HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
with a good memory (about 1.4 percentage points). However, these estimates are also
insignificant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the missing check amount measure does not
appear to capture an increase in response uncertainty between the interviews conducted
early and late in the payment cycle.
Figure 3.2. Fraction of Missing Check Amounts
Notes: The estimates are based on HRS 1994 data. Memory good: N = 853. Memory bad: N = 370. The figure illustrates the
estimates by memory capacity, without controls, from Table 3.3.
Conversely, Table 3.4 indicates that uncertainty does increase based on the focal re-
sponse measures. For the full sample, the estimations in Columns (1) and (2) yield that
the fraction of check amounts rounded to multiples of 10, 50, and 100, respectively,
increases by about 18 to 26 percent in the late payment cycle stage relative to the cor-
responding rounding shares in the early payment cycle stage (which are given by the
estimates for the constants in the first column). After adding controls in Column (2), all
of the estimates are significant at conventional levels.
Columns (3)–(6) present the estimation results by memory capacity. In Figures 3.3–3.5,
Panel A illustrates the estimates without controls, as shown in Columns (3) and (5) of
Table 3.4. For the memory good group, the estimates are smaller compared with the
full sample results, and insignificant at the 10 percent level. While the point estimates
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for the 10- and 50-focal response measures may still suggest a small increase in the
fraction of rounded responses for the memory good individuals interviewed late in the
payment cycle, the point estimates in Columns (3) and (4) of Panel C do not suggest
that rounding to multiples of 100 increases late in the payment cycle for respondents
with a good memory. Conversely, for the respondents who have a bad memory, the
estimates in Columns (5) and (6) give that the increase in the fraction of rounded Social
Security check amounts between the early and late payment cycle stage is even larger
than for the full sample. In all regressions but one, these increases are significant at
conventional levels. For the 100-focal response measure in Panel C, the estimations
indicate a particularly large increase of 10.6 percentage points after adding controls.
This corresponds to an approximately 110 percent increase relative to the bad memory
group’s fraction of 100-focal responses early in the payment cycle, which is 9.7 percent.
Columns (7)–(10) report the estimates from regressions where the individuals with a
bad memory are grouped by their unawareness of their bad mental ability. The estimates
without controls are illustrated in Figures 3.3–3.5, Panel B; they correspond to Columns
(7) and (9) of Table 3.4. Similar to the previous grouping based on memory capacity,
splitting by unawareness of bad mental ability again leads to increased estimates for one
group and decreased estimates for the other group: for individuals who are unaware of
their bad mental ability, the change in the fraction of rounded responses between the
early and late payment cycle stage goes up across all three rounding measures, and is
significant at conventional levels in all regressions, whereas for the individuals who are
aware of their bad mental ability, the estimates become smaller and insignificant at the
10 percent level.
In sum, our analysis findings based on the focal response measures suggest that the
uncertainty in the reported Social Security check amount increases in the time since
the last Social Security check receipt. The increase appears to be especially driven by
respondents who have a bad memory, and among these individuals, respondents who
are unaware of their bad mental ability seem to exhibit a particularly large increase in
their response uncertainty over the payment cycle. These findings are in line with our
hypotheses.
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Figure 3.3. Fraction of 10-Focal Responses
Notes: Memory good: N = 796. Memory bad: N = 343. Aware: N = 126. Unaware: N = 217. The estimates are based on
HRS 1994 data. The figure illustrates the estimates by memory capacity and unawareness of bad mental ability, without controls,
from Panel A in Table 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Fraction of 50-Focal Responses
Notes: Memory good: N = 796. Memory bad: N = 343. Aware: N = 126. Unaware: N = 217. The estimates are based on
HRS 1994 data. The figure illustrates the estimates by memory capacity and unawareness of bad mental ability, without controls,
from Panel B in Table 3.4.
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Figure 3.5. Fraction of 100-Focal Responses
Notes: Memory good: N = 796. Memory bad: N = 343. Aware: N = 126. Unaware: N = 217. The estimates are based on
HRS 1994 data. The figure illustrates the estimates by memory capacity and unawareness of bad mental ability, without controls,
from Panel C in Table 3.4.
3.4 Robustness Checks
The previous section showed that the uncertainty in the Social Security check amount
increases for individuals who are interviewed late rather than early in the monthly So-
cial Security payment cycle, based on our focal response measures. To assert that this
finding is not sensitive to the definition of the late Social Security payment cycle stage,
we re-estimate our rounding analysis, using two alternative late dummy definitions. Ta-
bles 3.5 and 3.6 present results where we decrease the late payment cycle stage window
by three and five days, respectively.9
Overall, the alternative estimations yield quite similar results as our main analysis. In
9Thus, the late dummy equals now one if an individual is interviewed 18–32 days and 20–32 days,
respectively, after the last Social Security check receipt.
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the full sample, the fraction of rounded check amounts increases between the early and
late interviews for all three focal response measures, even though some estimates lose
significance at the 10 percent level compared with the respective main estimates. The
increases for the memory bad group are again larger than for the full sample, and in
most regressions even slightly larger than the corresponding main analysis results. A
reason for the slightly larger increases could be that decreasing the late payment cycle
stage window may especially increase the check amount uncertainty in the late group.10
For the individuals with a good memory, the point estimates in Panel A of both tables
may also suggest a small increase in 10-focal responses between the early and late stage
of the payment cycle. The point estimates in Panels B and C, however, do not support
the notion that there is an increase in 50- or 100-focal responses. Additionally, all of
the memory good group estimates are insignificant at the 10 percent level, just as in the
main analysis. Dividing the individuals with a bad memory by unawareness of their bad
mental ability, the regressions for the unaware group again yield estimates that are larger
than for the whole memory bad sample. All of these estimates, except for one, are also
again significant at conventional levels. For the respondents who are aware of their bad
mental ability, the point estimates generally decrease compared with the estimates for
all bad memory individuals, and all of these estimates, apart from two, are insignificant
at the 10 percent level. The findings for the respondents who are aware of their bad
mental ability are thus also similar to the corresponding main estimates.
10Decreasing the late payment cycle stage window implies that the late group individuals are on aver-
age further away from their last Social Security check arrival, which likely increases the group’s overall
response uncertainty. However, decreasing the window also shifts individuals, who are likely more un-
certain, from the late to the early group. For this reason, it is unclear how changing the late dummy
definition affects the estimates in general, and depends on how exactly the uncertainty increases over the
Social Security payment cycle.
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3.5 Conclusions
Using data from a natural experiment, this paper has demonstrated that subjective un-
certainty about a quantity – specifically, Social Security income – influences responses
to an open-ended survey question. In the natural experiment, variations in uncertainty
were induced by the fact that Social Security checks are always delivered on the same
day of the month while survey interview dates are distributed over the whole month.
Hence, time elapsed between check delivery and interview varies randomly across re-
spondents. The analysis in this paper has also shown that these response effects interact
with the respondents’ memory capacity in non-trivial ways.
The size of the effects we found is small, which raises the question of whether the find-
ings of this study are relevant for practical work. However, reporting one’s Social Secu-
rity income is, arguably, a relatively simple task so one would probably expect to find
no such effects at all. Other tasks such as reporting consumption expenditure are more
difficult and known to suffer from recall error. More research on the role of respondents’
uncertainty about such quantities is important but also difficult because uncertainty is
unobserved – this is why the natural experiment we studied here is so valuable. An
important implication is that survey agencies should make survey metadata, such as
interview dates, routinely available with the survey data itself. Survey metadata can
provide information that can be exploited in the estimation of econometric models of
survey response error, as in the framework laid out by Hoderlein and Winter (2010).
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Chapter 4
Testing under a Special Form of
Heteroscedasticity1
4.1 Introduction
In the June 2011 issue of the American Economic Review, Vikesh Amin commented on
an article by Dorothe Bonjour et al. published in December 2003 also in the American
Economic Review. Bonjour et al. (2003) estimated the private return to education using
a data set containing 428 female monozygotic twins. One of their main findings was an
estimated return to one additional year of education of 7.7 percent, which is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. Amin (2011) replicated their results and performed
similar estimations where he excluded outliers. He found that many of Bonjour et al.’s
within-twin pair estimates became smaller in magnitude and significant only at lower
levels or insignificant when removing these extreme values.
In this study, we show that the inference in Amin (2011) is mostly incorrect due to the
presence of a special form of heteroscedasticity. The correct standard errors turn out to
be around 15 percent lower, leading to different policy conclusions. In contrast to Amin
(2011), we find a significant positive return to education for most of the within-twin pair
regressions.
1This chapter is an extended version of the paper by Farbmacher and Kögel (2017), published in
Applied Economics Letters.
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In Section 4.2, we provide a theoretical background for the situation when an upward
bias in conventional standard errors occurs. There, we also discuss the difficulties in
using standard tests for heteroscedasticity in such settings. We then propose a het-
eroscedasticity test which has better power properties. Section 4.3 presents the results
of a series of Monte Carlo simulations based on data exhibiting this special form of het-
eroscedasticity. In Section 4.4, we use three test procedures to test for heteroscedasticity
in Bonjour et al.’s (2003) data set. The Koenker variant of the Breusch-Pagan test and
the White test do not reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity, which is as expected,
due to the special form of heteroscedasticity present. However, our proposed test rejects
the null hypothesis, in favor of the special form of heteroscedasticity. Also in Section
4.4, we present the within-twin pair regressions using the appropriate standard errors.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Inference Issues and Test Procedure
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, conventional standard errors (which assume ho-
moscedasticity) can be biased up or down. The most common form of heteroscedastic-
ity, where the residual variance rises in increasing regressor values, usually leads to con-
ventional standard errors that are too small. When Wald tests based on these standard
errors are insignificant, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors do not change infer-
ence. On the other hand, inference is conservative in a setting with upward-biased con-
ventional standard errors. Using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors may change
inference in this case.
Angrist and Pischke (2010) derive the condition for such an upward bias in the classical
bivariate linear regression model2
yi = α + βxi + ei, (4.1)
2A similar insight can be derived in the multivariate regression model by partialling out all other
covariates.
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where the true sampling variance for the OLS estimator β̂ can be written as
σ2
β̂
=
1
n
V ar[ei(xi − x̄)]
V ar[xi]2
. (4.2)
Under the assumption of homoscedasticity, V ar(ei|xi) = σ2e , the equation simplifies to
the conventional standard error
[σ2
β̂
]conv =
1
n
σ2e
V ar[xi]
. (4.3)
Thus,
[σ2
β̂
]conv > σ
2
β̂
⇐⇒ σ2e >
V ar[ei(xi − x̄)]
V ar[xi]
. (4.4)
Since
V ar[ei(xi − x̄)] = E[e2i (xi − x̄)2] (4.5)
= E[e2i ]E[(xi − x̄)2] + Cov[e2i , (xi − x̄)2] (4.6)
= σ2eV ar[xi] + Cov[e
2
i , (xi − x̄)2], (4.7)
the relationship in (4.4) can further be rewritten as
[σ2
β̂
]conv > σ
2
β̂
⇐⇒ Cov[e2i , (xi − x̄)2] < 0. (4.8)
An upward bias in conventional standard errors occurs if there is a negative covariance
between the squared residual e2i and the squared deviation of xi from its mean x̄. The
further away xi is from x̄, the smaller becomes V ar[ei|xi] = E[e2i |xi], the conditional
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variance of residual ei. When Cov[e2i , (xi − x̄)2] < 0, the corresponding scatter plot
of ei on the regressor xi often resembles an ellipse. That is why we refer to this form
of heteroscedasticity as elliptical heteroscedasticity. Panel A in Figure 4.1 illustrates
the elliptical shape of the residuals based on simulated data, exhibiting elliptical het-
eroscedasticity.
If the data exhibit elliptical heteroscedasticity, the usual Wald tests for hypotheses about
β in the bivariate regression model using conventional standard errors give an actual size
smaller than the nominal size. Policy conclusions based on estimates with conventional
standard errors are thus conservative. Conversely, Wald tests using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are size-correct and yield therefore valid policy conclusions. Fur-
thermore, heteroscedasticity-robust Wald tests lead to power gains compared to tests
using conventional standard errors in this case.
When elliptical heteroscedasticity is present, a reverse ‘U’-shaped relation between the
squared residual e2i and the regressor xi often occurs. Hence, statistical procedures
testing for linear forms of heteroscedasticity, based on e2i as the dependent variable,
usually fail to detect elliptical heteroscedasticity. Panel B in Figure 4.1 illustrates how
the linear regression line from the regression of e2i on xi is close to zero, as the squared
residuals first rise and then fall in an increasing xi. Therefore, tests such as the Breusch-
Pagan (1979) test with xi as the only independent variable included usually do not re-
ject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. In addition, more general tests, for example the
White (1980) test, to detect also non-linear heteroscedasticity, do not give information
about the form of heteroscedasticity that is present. This is because such test proce-
dures test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against the unspecific alternative of
no homoscedasticity. Moreover, due to their open formulation of null and alternative
hypothesis, more general tests can possess a lower power in detecting elliptical het-
eroscedasticity.
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Figure 4.1. Elliptical Heteroscedasticity Example
Panel A. Scatter Plot Illustrating the Elliptical Shape of the Residuals
Panel B. Regression of the Squared Residuals on x
Notes: The data are simulated data based on the data generating process in Section 4.3. N = 250; a = 0.2.
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By exploiting the relationship in (4.8), we can test specifically for elliptical heteroscedas-
ticity in the classical bivariate regression model. To derive our elliptical heteroscedas-
ticity test, consider the regression
e2i = δ0 + δ1(xi − x̄)2 + ξi, (4.9)
where the squared residuals e2i are obtained from the regression of yi on xi. Under
elliptical heteroscedasticity, we know that Cov[e2i , (xi − x̄)2] < 0 and therefore
δ1 =
Cov[e2i , (xi − x̄)2]
V ar[(xi − x̄)2]
< 0 . (4.10)
Thus, by using this knowledge, we can test specifically for elliptical heteroscedasticity.
Our elliptical heteroscedasticity test conducts a one-sided Wald test for H0 : δ1 ≥ 0
against Ha : δ1 < 0 in the regression e2i = δ0 + δ1(xi − x̄)2 + ξi. The hypotheses are
H0: no elliptical heteroscedasticity and Ha: elliptical heteroscedasticity.
4.3 Monte Carlo Simulations
To illustrate the testing issues arising from elliptical heteroscedasticity, we run a series
of Monte Carlo simulations. The design of our Monte Carlo simulations is based on the
following data generating process.
yi = 0.04xi + ei
ei =
√
1
{(xi − x̄)2 + 0.1}a
εi
xi = [x
∗
i ], x
∗
i ∼ N(0.04, 1.82), εi ∼ N(0, 1),
a = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, . . . , 0.5
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We choose the model so that the shape of the resulting y-x scatter plot resembles Panel
A of Figure 1 by Amin (2011), which is replicated in Panel A of Figure 4.4 in the next
section. For values of a between 0.15 and 0.3, the y-x scatter plot is most similar to
Panel A. The operator [.] rounds x∗i to the nearest integer. Hence, xi is an integer, just as
the within-twin difference in years of schooling in Bonjour et al. (2003). Furthermore,
also in accordance with the within-twin difference in years of schooling, the values
of xi are centered around the mean x̄. The structure of the error term ei implies that
Cov[e2i , (xi − x̄)2] < 0 if a > 0. The larger is the parameter a, the more negative is
the covariance between e2i and (xi − x̄)2, and therefore the stronger is the upward bias
caused by elliptical heteroscedasticity. For a = 0, the error term is homoscedastic. The
number of observations is set to N = 214, as in Bonjour et al.’s (2003) data set, and
additionally to N = 2, 140. The number of replications is 10,000.
In each simulation, we evaluate the size and power of three different tests for het-
eroscedasticity: the Koenker (1981) variant of the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test, which
drops the assumption of normality of the error term, with x as the independent vari-
able, the White test, and our elliptical heteroscedasticity test introduced in Section 4.2.
In addition, we compare the size and power for the parameter of interest in the causal
model, using Wald tests for the hypothesis H0 : β = k against Ha : β 6= k, for
k = 0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.12, in the regression of yi on xi using robust and conventional
standard errors.
Figure 4.2 shows the power plots for the heteroscedasticity tests. The simulation with
a = 0 gives the actual size of each test. While the rejection frequency of the Breusch-
Pagan and White test is close to the given significance level of α = 5% for N =
214, the actual size of the elliptical heteroscedasticity test is above this value, with
11.9%. However, the actual test size for the latter test approaches the theoretically given
significance level for larger numbers of observations. The simulation with N = 2, 140
yields an actual size of 7.7% for the elliptical heteroscedasticity test.
For a > 0, Figure 4.2 displays the power of each test. The rejection frequency of
the White test and our elliptical heteroscedasticity test increases with stronger ellip-
tical heteroscedasticity, i.e., with increasing values of a. Compared to the elliptical
heteroscedasticity test, the White test performs worse in detecting heteroscedasticity,
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Figure 4.2. Power Plots for the Heteroscedasticity Tests
Panel A. N = 214
Panel B. N = 2, 140
Notes: The plots show the heteroscedasticity tests’ rejection frequencies of H0 at α = 0.05 from the Monte Carlo Simulations.
For the Breusch-Pagan and White test: H0: Homoscedasticity; Ha: Heteroscedasticity. For the elliptical heteroscedasticity test:
H0: No elliptical heteroscedasticity; Ha: Elliptical heteroscedasticity. For a = 0, the data exhibit homoscedasticity. For a > 0,
the data exhibit elliptical heteroscedasticity. For values of a in the gray shaded area, the resulting y-x scatter plot of the generated
data is most similar to Amin’s (2011) Panel A in Figure 1, which is replicated in Figure 4.4.
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although the difference in power gets smaller for larger values of a. In contrast to the el-
liptical heteroscedasticity test, the White test does not have elliptical heteroscedasticity
as the alternative hypothesis, but rather heteroscedasticity in general. The less specific
formulation ofHa may explain the White test’s worse performance. The Breusch-Pagan
test has considerably smaller rejection frequencies than the two other tests throughout
the whole range of a > 0. For N = 214 and N = 2, 140, it does not reach a power of
5% for any given positive value of a. This result may be related to the fact that the basic
specification of the Breusch-Pagan test is for detecting linear forms of heteroscedastic-
ity, whereas elliptical heteroscedasticity implies a non-linear form of heteroscedasticity.
Figure 4.3 displays the power and size of the Wald tests. The actual size of the tests is
given at H0 : β = 0.04. Under homoscedasticity, a = 0, both test versions’ actual sizes
are close to the given significance level of 5%, for N = 214 and N = 2, 140. In the
presence of heteroscedasticity, a > 0, the Wald tests using robust standard errors yield
also an actual size around 5%. The size of the Wald tests using conventional standard
errors, however, decreases with increasing a, such that at a = 0.5, the actual size for
both sample sizes is only around 0.1%. Hence, t-tests with conventional standard errors
do not reject the correct null hypothesis often enough for a > 0. This is due to the
upward bias in conventional standard errors in this case.
For H0 : β 6= 0.04, Figure 4.3 shows the power of the Wald tests. At a = 0, the power
curves of both tests are almost the same. However, an ever increasing gap between them
generally arises as a gets larger. The Wald test using robust standard errors becomes
more powerful whereas the test using conventional standard errors loses power. The
loss in power can be attributed to the increasing upward bias in conventional standard
errors for rising values of a > 0. As expected, the tests’ power gets larger the further
away the null hypothesis is from the true parameter β = 0.04, and the tests have a higher
power for N = 2, 140 than for N = 214.
111
CHAPTER 4. TESTING UNDER HETEROSCEDASTICITY
Figure 4.3. Power Plots for Wald Tests Using Conventional and Robust Standard Errors
N = 214 N = 2140
Notes: The plots show the Wald tests’ rejection frequencies for H0 : β = k against Ha : β 6= k, k = 0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.12, at
α = 0.05 from the Monte Carlo Simulations. The true parameter β equals 0.04. For a = 0, the data exhibit homoscedasticity. For
a > 0, the data exhibit elliptical heteroscedasticity.
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4.4 Empirical Illustration: Returns to Education
As discussed in the introduction, Amin (2011) replicated Bonjour et al.’s (2003) esti-
mates of the return to education and performed similar regressions where he excluded
outliers from their sample of monozygotic twins. Specifically, he excluded up to four
twin pair outliers on the basis of the absolute between-twin difference in hourly wages.
Figure 4.4, which replicates Figure 1 by Amin (2011), illustrates which data points he
removed. Panel A already suggests that the data exhibit the elliptical heteroscedasticity
discussed in Section 4.2, which leads to an upward bias in conventional standard errors.3
Figure 4.4. Replication of Figure 1, Amin (2011)
Notes: N = 214. The data are from Bonjour et al. (2003). The twin pairs in the data set are from the St. Thomas’ UK Adult Twin
Registry. The labelled observations correspond to the outliers which Amin (2011) excluded.
3We noticed that outlier number 2 in Amin’s (2011) Panel B does not correspond to the data point
labelled 2 in his Panel A. As shown in our Figure 4.4, observation number 2 in Panel B is actually the data
point with a difference in log hourly wages of approximately −2 instead of the point at approximately
−3. Despite this graphical error, Amin (2011) excluded the correct observations in his analysis.
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To test for the presence of heteroscedasticity, we perform the three tests outlined in Sec-
tion 4.2 for all within-twin pair OLS and IV regressions in columns (3), (4), and (7), (8)
of Table 1 in Amin (2011). In all regressions, the dependent variable is the within-twin
difference in log hourly wages. The regressor of interest is the within-twin difference
in self-reported education. In the IV regressions, this variable is instrumented by the
within-twin difference in the co-twin’s report of the other twin’s education. The regres-
sions in columns (7) and (8) include the covariates within-twin difference in marital
status, current job tenure, part-time status, and whether a person lives in London or the
south-east of the UK.
Table 4.1 provides the p-values for the Koenker variant of the Breusch-Pagan test with
within-twin difference in years of schooling as the only independent variable, the White
test, and our proposed elliptical heteroscedasticity test. In the regressions including
covariates, we partialled them out before testing. The elliptical heteroscedasticity test
rejects for all regression specifications at least at the 10 percent level. In contrast, the
Breusch-Pagan and White test do not reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity in any
regression. This may be attributed to the difficulties and lower power in detecting el-
liptical heteroscedasticity when using more general tests as discussed in Section 4.2.
Based on our proposed elliptical heteroscedasticity test, there is thus evidence for the
presence of elliptical heteroscedasticity in the data. This suggests that conventional
standard errors are incorrect and may lead to false policy conclusions.
Table 4.2 shows the return to education estimates. Our replication results are very sim-
ilar to the estimates by Amin (2011). The regressions based on the full sample are the
ones which Bonjour et al. (2003) also performed. Amin (2011) and Bonjour et al.
(2003) both used conventional standard errors. In addition to the replications using con-
ventional standard errors, Table 4.2 reports robust standard errors and the corresponding
significance levels. In all but two regressions, the robust standard error is smaller than
the conventional one. This result is in line with the suspicion that elliptical heteroscedas-
ticity is present in the data, which causes an upward bias in conventional standard errors.
It also supports the conclusions from our elliptical heteroscedasticity test.
In many regressions where the estimate for the parameter of interest is insignificant
using conventional standard errors, it becomes significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent
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Table 4.1. Heteroscedasticity Test Results for the Within-Twin Pair Regressions in
Table 1, Amin (2011)
Within-twin pair Within-twin pair
without covariates with covariates
OLS IV OLS IV
Sample (3) (4) (7) (8)
Full Bonjour et
al. (2003) data
set
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.3645 0.3124 0.6090 0.5435
White Test 0.4805 0.4581 0.5300 0.5603
Elliptical Het. Test 0.0096 0.0234 0.0113 0.0295
Observations 214 214 187 187
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £90
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.7221 0.6719 0.8713 0.8276
White Test 0.4982 0.4906 0.5451 0.5491
Elliptical Het. Test 0.0109 0.0107 0.0194 0.0211
Observations 213 213 186 186
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £75
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.7207 0.6737 0.7799 0.7437
White Test 0.5488 0.5421 0.6034 0.6075
Elliptical Het. Test 0.0176 0.0173 0.0341 0.0383
Observations 212 212 185 185
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £65
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.7143 0.7065 0.8136 0.8126
White Test 0.6147 0.6101 0.6562 0.6559
Elliptical Het. Test 0.0297 0.0286 0.0464 0.0461
Observations 211 211 184 184
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £60
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.9861 0.9466 0.8177 0.8014
White Test 0.6310 0.6237 0.7247 0.7194
Elliptical Het. Test 0.0586 0.0534 0.0824 0.0813
Observations 210 210 183 183
Notes: The data are from Bonjour et al. (2003). The table reports p-values from heteroscedasticity tests for each sample and
regression specification. The column numbers indicate which column in Amin’s (2011) Table 1 the results refer to. See the notes
for Table 4.2 for further information on the regression specifications.
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Table 4.2. Replication and Re-Estimation of the Within-Twin Pair Regressions in Table
1, Amin (2011)
Within-twin pair Within-twin pair
without covariates with covariates
OLS IV OLS IV
Sample (3) (4) (7) (8)
Full Bonjour et al.
(2003) data set
β̂education 0.039 0.077 0.039 0.082
Conventional SE (0.023)∗ (0.033)∗∗ (0.024) (0.036)∗∗
Robust SE (0.018)∗∗ (0.039)∗∗ (0.018)∗∗ (0.043)∗
Observations 214 214 187 187
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £90
β̂education 0.032 0.050 0.034 0.053
Conventional SE (0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.033)
Robust SE (0.016)∗∗ (0.027)∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.030)∗
Observations 213 213 186 186
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £75
β̂education 0.032 0.050 0.036 0.055
Conventional SE (0.021) (0.030)∗ (0.022) (0.032)∗
Robust SE (0.016)∗∗ (0.027)∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.030)∗
Observations 212 212 185 185
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £65
β̂education 0.032 0.036 0.036 0.039
Conventional SE (0.020) (0.029) (0.021)∗ (0.031)
Robust SE (0.016)∗∗ (0.022) (0.017)∗∗ (0.024)
Observations 211 211 184 184
Drop if abs. wage
difference > £60
β̂education 0.028 0.036 0.036 0.041
Conventional SE (0.019) (0.027) (0.019)∗ (0.028)
Robust SE (0.016)∗ (0.022) (0.016)∗∗ (0.023)∗
Observations 210 210 183 183
Notes: The data are from Bonjour et al. (2003). The table reports estimates of the return to one additional year of education based on
a sample of monozygotic twins from the UK. The columns are numbered according to the corresponding columns in Amin’s (2011)
Table 1. The dependent variable is the within-twin difference in log hourly wages. The regressor of interest is the within-twin
difference in years of schooling. The covariates are the within-twin differences in the following variables: marital status, current
job tenure, part-time status, and whether a person lives in London or the south-east of the UK. In the IV regressions, the within-
twin difference in self-reported education is instrumented by the within-twin difference in the co-twin’s report of the other twin’s
education.
* *** Significant at the 1 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 5 percent level.*
* *** Significant at the 10 percent level.
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level when using robust standard errors. With conventional standard errors, 13 out of the
20 regressions yield an insignificant parameter estimate. In contrast, only in three out of
the 20 regressions do we fail to find a return to education estimate that is significantly
different from zero when using robust standard errors. In particular, all point estimates
based on the full sample as well as the sample excluding observations with an absolute
wage difference of more than £90 and £75, respectively, are significant at the usual
levels. Regarding the regressions based on samples with three or four outliers removed,
three more estimates turn significant at least at the 10 percent level with robust standard
errors compared to the results which use conventional standard errors. Thus, when using
robust rather than conventional standard errors, the vast majority of regressions in Table
4.2 suggests that there is a positive return to education.
4.5 Conclusion
In this study, we discuss the conditions under which conventional, homoscedasticity-
assuming, standard errors are upward biased. In such settings, standard tests of het-
eroscedasticity may fail and leave the heteroscedasticity undetected. When Wald tests
based on downward-biased conventional standard errors are insignificant, heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors do not change inference. On the other hand, inference is conser-
vative in a setting with upward-biased conventional standard errors. We discuss the
power gains when using robust standard errors in this case and also potential prob-
lems of heteroscedasticity tests. In Monte Carlo simulations we show that our proposed
heteroscedasticity test has a higher power in detecting this special form of heteroscedas-
ticity. In our application only this test detects the heteroscedasticity, and using then the
appropriate standard errors leads to different test decisions.
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Åkerstedt, T. (2006). Psychosocial Stress and Impaired Sleep. Scandinavian Journal of
Work, Environment & Health, 32(6), 493–501.
Amin, V. (2011). Returns to Education: Evidence from UK Twins: Comment. American
Economic Review, 101(4), 1629–1635.
Angel, S., Disslbacher, F., Humer, S., and Schnetzer, M. (2019). What Did You Really
Earn Last Year?: Explaning Measurement Error in Survey Income Data. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, forthcoming.
Angrist, J., and Pischke, J.-S. (2010). A Note on Bias in Conventional Standard Errors
under Heteroskedasticity. Mathematical Note. Retrieved from http://econ.lse.ac.uk/
staff/spischke/mhe/josh/Notes%20on%20conv%20std%20error.pdf
Athey, S., and Imbens, G. (2016). Recursive Partitioning for Heterogeneous Causal Ef-
fects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(27), 7353–7360.
Athey, S., and Imbens, G. (2019). Machine Learning Methods That Economists Should
Know About. Annual Review of Economics, 11, 685–725.
Athey, S., Tibshirani, J., and Wager, S. (2019). Generalized Random Forests. Annals of
Statistics, 47(2), 1148–1178.
Barr, M. S. (2012). No Slack: The Financial Lives of Low-Income Americans. Washing-
ton, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
118
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Battistin, E., Miniaci, R., and Weber, G. (2003). What Do We Learn from Recall Con-
sumption Data? Journal of Human Resources, 38(2), 354–385.
Battistin, E., and Padula, M. (2016). Survey Instruments and the Reports of Consump-
tion Expenditures: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 179(2), 559–581.
Benson, H., and Proctor, W. (2010). Relaxation Revolution: Enhancing Your Personal
Health Through the Science and Genetics of Mind Body Healing. New York: Scrib-
ner.
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., and Shafir, E. (2004). A Behavioral-Economics View of
Poverty. American Economic Review, 94(2), 419–423.
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., and Shafir, E. (2006). Behavioral Economics and Mar-
keting in Aid of Decision Making among the Poor. Journal of Public Policy and
Marketing, 25(1), 8–23.
Binder, C. C. (2017). Measuring Uncertainty Based on Rounding: New Method and
Application to Inflation Expectations. Journal of Monetary Economics, 90, 1–12.
Bonjour, D., Cherkas, L. F., Haskel, J. E., Hawkes, D. D., and Spector, T. D. (2003). Re-
turns to Education: Evidence from U.K. Twins. American Economic Review, 93(5),
1799–1812.
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